Vol. VII / No. 16 | October 2026
Authors:
Bilqiis Ayu Syifa – Undergraduate Student, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia
Summary
Following the initial strike from the United States (U.S.) and Israel, Iran effectively closed The Strait of Hormuz in response. Despite the presence of a relatively stronger U.S. navy based near the strait, questions arise as to how Iran can launch its military operation in the strait. Using the framework of ‘Grey Zone Operations’, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz can be deconstructed into three main variables (the ends, the ways, and the means) that are going to explain how Iran’s actions were a maritime strategy. Evidenced by the economic pressure that Iran generates through, at least, four avenues (international engagement, lawfare, influence operations, and integrated approach) utilizing instruments and resources that Iran developed on their own. This deconstruction illustrates how Iran’s maritime strategy enables it to counter a more superior naval force, achieve its strategic objective, and avoid any disproportionate damage.
Introduction
In February 2026, the United States of America (U.S.) and Israel launched strikes against several Iran facilities, including nuclear facilities, military bases, and missile infrastructure. The strike pushed Iran to use its primary strategic leverage: closing the Strait of Hormuz waterway. Although the U.S. maintains a naval base in Bahrain (which is not far from the Strait of Hormuz), Iran’s closure can not be easily countered, even by a conventionally superior naval presence. Therefore, it raises a question as to how Iran could launch its maritime strategy in the Strait of Hormuz with the U.S. navy shadowing the area. This article addresses the question using the ‘Grey Zone Operations’ framework by Geoffrey Till through one of his books Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (2026). In order to deconstruct a study case, the Grey Zone Operations framework uses an ‘Ends-Ways-Means’ approach to illustrate how Iran defends its country using coercive force below a full-scale military operation to fulfill its objective without facing excessive damage.
The Ends: Economic Pressure
The Strait of Hormuz is a vulnerable waterway as it acts as the only door from and to the Persian Gulf. In 2025, around 25% of the world seaborne oil trade and 19% of the world seaborne liquified natural gas (LNG) trade pass through this waterway. By the second month of the closure, shipments of crude oil, LNG, and fertilizer-related products (the commodities that dominate the trade in this waterway) dropped sharply, almost touching zero. Crude oil vessel transit declined by up to 95%, representing 30%-33% of the world trade volume. LNG vessel transits dropped extremely up to 99%, almost stopping the whole shipment through the strait, representing 20% of the world trade volume. Vessel transits carrying fertilizer-related products also fell sharply, almost to zero in March. Although trade in this commodity shifted somewhat, the decline still reached as much as 87%, and the affected flows represent 30% of world trade volume.
As the U.S. continues to plan its military action in the strait, Iran has responded by closing off the strait and any aggression from the U.S. will result in further strikes. As of October 2026, the numbers of vessel attacks continue to plunge. Resulting in slowing down oil exports and spiking crude oil prices, that has touched $100 per barrel. Besides oil, food security issues are also rising as the trade flow of fertilizer-related products is jammed. The impact is no longer in regional scope with countries along the Persian Gulf facing direct hindrance of their trade, it has become a global concern, even for the U.S.
Beyond exerting pressure on global trade, the closure imposed significant costs to the U.S. military as the opponent of Iran in the war. With the combination of geographical gain and an unconventional method, Iran with cheap drones and sea mines was able to withhold U.S. attempts on penetrating the Strait of Hormuz.
The Ways and Methods: Iran’s Endeavor to Reach Its Objective
Iran’s endeavor can be divided into four: international engagement, lawfare, influence operations, and integrated approach. First, Iran engaged several countries to cultivate international support. Iran openly declared to welcome countries in the Strait of Hormuz except for the U.S. and its alliances, pushing some countries (Pakistan, India, Turkey, China, France, and Italy) to pursue diplomatic efforts with Iran in exchange for a safe passageway for their vessels. Besides building support from countries that it has already established a good relationship with, Iran also collects support from Oman (U.S. alliance) with a ‘non-discriminative fee’ offer for ships that are passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Second, Iran utilized the legal ambiguities around the Persian Gulf jurisdiction. Iran’s navy (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy [IRGCN]) made use of the overlapping rule of law in the Strait of Hormuz, including the complicated narrow and congested Strait of Hormuz from the oil rig, dispute on overlapping jurisdiction claim, and traffic separation schemes for sudden ambushes. Additionally, Iran made a GPS signal spoofing that makes it difficult for law-abiding victims by puzzling them on where they are and what they are allowed to do. Beside that, to maintain the legal status on its control above The Strait of Hormuz, Iran rejected lawsuits against their country: Iran’s action is not a form of closing the waterways, but merely an adjustment during a war; The requirements that Iran gave such as giving an early notification, special line, monitoring, up to vessels check to determine neutrals and nonneutrals party; Iran stated that its action was legal by law. Iran’s maneuver that is still considerably legitimate under the law makes it impossible for them to get legal sanctions.
Third, Iran shaped a doctrine that strengthened domestic support while weakening their opponent. This doctrine was built through a long history of Iran as an Islamic Shiah country with a martyrdom complex. In fact, Ali Khamenei who was loathed before he was killed by the Israeli bomb, came to be viewed as a martyr by many Iranians. This doctrine is maintained by the IRGCN that challenged opponents with a more conventional approach.
Therefore, the three components that have been explained before need one commando to run it. An integrated approach is needed to make sure there is one common objective. This point is depicted in Iran’s military operation that is cohesive between components, both Iran’s government and military have one common objective that is taking control of the strait. The cohesion between components is manifested through Iran’s effort to dam the international support while using the legal loopholes and navy power.
The Means and Resources: Utilization of Iran’s Benefit
Sufficient resource capacity is one of the requirements to work out a military operation. However, the war between the U.S. and Iran displayed a clear capacity gap between the navies. This asymmetrical position can be put into good use, if Iran utilizes it well. Instead of chasing what the U.S. has, Iran innovated its own tactic and developed their own technology. Since the 1980s, the IRGC has been investing to develop drones and owning an armory with 41 different types of missile, drone, torpedo, and drone carrier. Deployments also included sea mines and ‘mosquito fleet’, a small vessel that is harder to detect by a traditional navy device. Iran sought to turn its adversary’s strength into a vulnerability by developing military technologies targeted at U.S. capital ships that operate around Iran’s water and U.S. naval base around the Persian Gulf as it acts as the U.S. naval command center in the region.
Aside from making a great use out of the resources, Iran’s hold of the Strait of Hormuz is backed by the fact that the closure is responsible for, at least, a few percent of the world’s energy trade that is also impacting the U.S. The weaponization of the energy supply chain does not only affect the global economy, but it also increased security hostility around U.S. alliances.
Conclusion
Therefore, Iran military operation in The Strait of Hormuz is understood as Grey Zone Operations maritime strategy through fulfillments of every three main variables from the Ends-Ways-Means approach. Iran adopted a Grey Zone Operations maritime strategy that doesn’t aim a one-on-one war with the U.S. and made a good use out of its resources by developing unconventional instruments that are far different from the U.S. conventional instruments. Iran reached its objective by not following standards that the U.S. set, but using a maritime strategy that put their country at advantage.
Aside from that, the Iran-U.S. war with the closure of The Strait of Hormuz becomes an interesting perspective for other strategic waterways, such as chokepoints in other areas. The Strait of Hormuz becomes a contemporary example of how sensitive the global economy is to chokepoint and how a maritime strategy can be applied to a grey area with overlapping claims. This case underscores the likelihood that similar strategies could be deployed in other strategic maritime chokepoints.