The Road Ahead: Populism and Japan’s ODA Strategy in ASEAN

The Road Ahead: Populism and Japan’s ODA Strategy in ASEAN

Mei 21, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 9 | May 2026

Authors:

Ahmad Fauzan Abbas – International Relations Graduate from Hasanuddin University

 

Summary

Populism in Japan is rooted in unresolved socioeconomic problems and dissatisfaction with the government. We then expand our discussion to assess the possible implications of populist aspirations towards Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme in ASEAN. We found that the surge of populist campaigns in Japan has not gathered sufficient power to influence the flow of Japan’s ODA. This essay serves as a preliminary research on the growing literature that seeks to explain the rise of populism in Japan and its implications for Japan’s foreign policies.

Keywords: Populism, Official Development Assistance, Japan-ASEAN Relations

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Populism In Japan

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) poor performance in the 2024 and 2025 elections has brought two implications. First, as the ruling party, the LDP’s consecutive losses in the 2024 and 2025 elections have weakened the party’s stance in the parliament (Govella, 2025). Grappling with this dilemma, Shigeru Ishiba, LDP’s sitting president and the prime minister of Japan, was forced to resign. After a tight LDP presidential election in the runoff, Sanae Takaichi soon assumed the party’s executive and the prime minister’s office. Second, the election campaign showed a rising concern regarding populist aspirations, which strongly correlates with the election result. The emergence of populist trends in Japan’s politics may be rooted in public dissatisfaction with socioeconomic problems. Key issues include the weakened Japanese economy and loose immigration policies  (Kimijima, 2025 ; Higuchi & Koo, 2025).

History has shown examples where populist regimes redirect their country’s foreign policy towards more hostile relations with others. Donald Trump is a notable example, with political scientists referring to him as a populist par excellence (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). Trump also shares the same narrative that immigrants enjoy the social benefits while the “true” citizens must endure economic hardship. His populism also pushes for re-orientation towards domestic issues. ASEAN countries then started to contemplate the impact of the populist wave in Japan that might influence how the Japanese view Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the region.

 

How Populism Influenced Foreign Aid?

There is still substantial debate among academics regarding the solid definition of populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017 ; Laclau, 2005). However, one shared element among them is the narrative of the “people majority” vs “elite minority”. This element is also highlighted in one of the most widely used approaches in the study of populism, the “ideational approach”. In this perspective, populism is seen as a thin-centered ideology. The society then separated into two clusters: “the pure people” against “the corrupt elite”. This approach believes that politics should express the general will of the people (Mudde, 2004).

Political scientists keep working to expand the study of populism, including on how populist movements may impact a country’s foreign policies. Destradi’s elaborate work (2025) on populism and foreign policy theorisation examined the correlation between the two through Mudde’s ideational approach. According to Destradi, as the consequences of populism as a “thin-centered” ideology, the effects do not directly translate as the substance of a country’s foreign policies. Rather, populist regimes influence foreign policies in procedural practices, that is, through personalization and mobilization.

Investigating the correlation between populist sentiment and foreign aid remains a relatively niche theme in the study of IR. Heinrich et al. (2021), offer a systemic examination of the relationship between the two. They conclude that anti-elitism and nativism (a major theme of populist campaigns) correlate with the reduction in government spending on foreign aid. The argument is that, in democratic competition, the incumbent government seeks electoral support from the masses. The electoral motives then allow the public to dictate government foreign aid spending.

 

Sanseito’s Populism and The Prospect of Japan’s ODA

The presence of populist campaigns could direct Japan’s foreign policies into an inward-looking stance. Questions have arisen about whether this may adversely affect foreign aid to recipient countries, notably, the members of ASEAN. A review of the figures (Table 1) indicates that a huge proportion of Japan’s ODA is distributed among Southeast Asian countries.

 

Japan’s ODA to ASEAN (in million yen)

Source: ODA Data Book by Country 2023, MOFA,  in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), 2025.

 

These concerns are not without basis. Shortly after being re-elected, President Trump instructed the suspension of U.S. foreign aid to other countries. The White House (2025) argued that the halt was intended to reassess the programme, which is distributed through various schemes of humanitarian issues. The policy itself is in line with Trump’s America First campaign. A populist proposal proved successful in securing his victory in the 2024 presidential election.

Sanseito, a rising populist opposition party in Japan, has consistently aligned with populist rhetoric that mobilizes the masses who are insecure about the current socioeconomic reality of today’s Japan (Takao, 2025). This faction later antagonizes the elite, whom they believe are responsible for the problems faced by Japanese society. In this context, Sanseito’s Japanese First slogan is a direct rendering of Trump’s America First. Both campaigns share the same characteristics. They embrace the ultra-conservative and nationalist ideologies while blaming the immigrants, liberal elites, and foreign capital (McCurry, 2025). The question that arises is whether Sanseito would also target Japan’s ODA scheme?

The short answer is no. As of today, Sanseito has never directly expressed any objection towards Japan’s ODA programme. Nevertheless, they repeatedly express their pessimistic stance towards globalism, which they view as a large corporation and the ideology of capital owners. From their view, globalism only produces economic injustice, undermines democracy, weakens the middle class, and erodes national sovereignty and identity (Sugawara, 2025).

If Sanseito decides to oppose the ODA programme, they would not be able to push for any substantial change of said policy, given the small size of their coalition inside the government. Here lies the major difference between Trump’s America First and Sanseito’s Japanese First: one represents a ruling regime, while the other is a minority opposition. Nevertheless, Sanseito’s popularity has increased in the last three elections. The party managed to increase the size of its seat in the House of Representatives to fifteen in the latest general election (Sonobe et. al., 2026). If this tendency continues, then Sanseito can be a game changer in Japanese foreign policy-making.

 

Putting Takaichi in the Equation

Our focus now turns to Sanae Takaichi. As the Prime Minister of Japan, her stance on Japanese ODA is significant. On various occasions, Takaichi has campaigned in line with Sanseito’s sentiments (see Simpson, 2025). Despite her use of populist rhetoric, Takaichi cannot be simply labelled as a populist actor. We need to differentiate between a populist and an opportunist who use general populist themes (such as conservatism and nationalism) to secure their vote.

As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s protégé, Takaichi is likely to continue the legacy of her mentor, the existing Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (Anindya, 2025). Takaichi will not deliberately sever ties with ASEAN, given its centrality to Japan’s economy and regional stability. Developing countries that act as an economic engine for ASEAN, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, are expected to continue receiving assistance for domestic infrastructure and institutional initiatives.

Through the ODA programme, Japan has actively contributed to the development of ASEAN member states. In Jakarta and Manila, Japan has supported public transportation projects. In disaster risk management, the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund has supported ASEAN’s humanitarian assistance and disaster management efforts. In terms of health cooperation, Japan has assisted ASEAN in strengthening the association’s capacity to respond to public health emergencies (MOFA, 2025).

In our analysis, Takaichi would respond to the citizens of Japan’s opinion on the issue of international cooperation funding. A poll from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2026) showed that 50,3% of Japanese respondents believe that the ODA scheme plays a role in securing resources and food. Some respondents also agree that ODA helped to promote peace, stability, and increase the prosperity of Japan while also increasing Japan’s exports. This highlights the positive sentiment of Japan’s citizens towards the ODA strategy.

To conclude, the generally positive sentiment among citizens validates the government’s policy on ODA spending. The populist actor Sanseito has also not targeted international assistance policy on a large scale, in contrast to the Trump administration in the United States. Populist in Japan have instead focused primarily on domestic socioeconomic issues, such as immigration and the economy. This helps explain the near absence of campaigns against ODA in Japan, which in turn supports the continuation of the program.

Securitizing Migration: Political Polarization and the Institutionalization of ICE Enforcement in the United States

Securitizing Migration: Political Polarization and the Institutionalization of ICE Enforcement in the United States

Mei 19, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 8 | May 2026

Authors:

Clarissa Aldora Simamora – Undergraduate Student, Department of International Relations, Brawijaya University

 

Summary

Following the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrests increased sharply, with enforcement intensity varying widely across states. This article argues that these disparities reflect the securitization of migration within a polarized political environment. Immigration governance has shifted from routine regulation toward institutionalized security enforcement embedded in detention systems and local policing. Drawing on enforcement data and empirical research on social impacts, the article shows how political polarization and public performance politics normalize extraordinary measures. While intensified enforcement is justified in the name of sovereignty and public safety, its consequences extend beyond arrest figures, affecting immigrant communities and student achievement. The article ultimately highlights a tension between state-centered security and human security, questioning whether current enforcement strategies reinforce long-term stability or generate deeper structural insecurity.

Keywords: Migration, Securitization, ICE, Politics of Fear, Human Security

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Political Polarization and Uneven Enforcement

It is not only partisan divides that shape immigration enforcement on the ground. Enforcement patterns are also influenced by institutional capacity, prosecutorial discretion, and the willingness of local law enforcement agencies to cooperate with federal authorities. Democratic-led states such as California generally support sanctuary policies and limit cooperation with federal immigration agencies, thereby reducing the operational reach of ICE within local jurisdictions. By contrast, Republican-led states such as Texas often mandate collaboration with federal authorities, prohibit sanctuary protections, and strengthen federal–local enforcement partnerships. These differing political orientations shape whether immigration enforcement becomes more constrained or normalized within state governance. As a result, federal immigration enforcement is implemented unevenly across states and is significantly influenced by domestic political dynamics and partisan alignments.

Such fragmentation has broader implications. It generates inconsistent exposure to enforcement risks, meaning that the lived experience of immigration policy differs dramatically depending on state of residence. This territorial unevenness reinforces the perception that migration governance is not merely legal administration but an arena of political contestation. Enforcement intensity becomes a symbolic extension of partisan identity, deepening polarization rather than producing uniform regulatory outcomes.

ICE arrest data show a sharp increase following the 2024 election, as documented by the UCLA Center for Neighborhood Knowledge (2025).  However, enforcement intensity differs dramatically across states. In some states, arrest rates remain below one per 1,000 non-citizens, while in others they exceed twenty per 1,000—an extraordinary disparity detailed in State Variations in ICE Arrests (2025). These differences are too large to be explained simply by demographic distribution or uniform federal statutes.

A closer comparison between California and Texas illustrates this divergence. Despite California having a comparable or larger non-citizen population, Texas recorded significantly higher arrest rates after adjusting for exposure risk, as shown in the California limits cooperation with federal immigration authorities, while Texas mandates collaboration and prohibits sanctuary-style protections, as also discussed in the ICE Arrests in California and Texas (2025). These differences demonstrate how immigration enforcement is shaped not only by federal law, but also by state-level political priorities and local institutional cooperation.

These patterns demonstrate that immigration enforcement is not merely the mechanical execution of federal law. Instead, it is filtered through local political will, institutional cooperation, and partisan alignment. Immigration policy becomes territorially differentiated, reflecting ideological divides rather than uniform administrative practice. In this sense, enforcement intensity operates as an extension of political identity.

Framing Migration as a Security Threat

Securitization theory provides a framework for understanding how migration shifts from policy issue to perceived existential threat. As explained in Security Studies: An Introduction (4th ed.), securitization occurs when political actors frame an issue as requiring extraordinary measures beyond normal democratic procedures.

The conceptual foundations of this approach are elaborated in Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (2003), which argues that security is socially constructed rather than objectively determined. Migration does not inherently threaten state survival. It becomes threatening when framed as endangering sovereignty, identity, or social cohesion.

Debates within contemporary security scholarship, summarized in Modern Schools of Thought in Security Studies (2023), further show how migration is often placed within the societal security sector. Here, concerns about cultural change and national identity become central to political discourse.

In the U.S. context, decades of rhetoric linking immigration to crime, border disorder, and demographic anxiety have contributed to this framing. Once migration is accepted as a security issue, expanded enforcement powers become politically defensible. Emergency language justifies extraordinary measures.

This idea is supported by what securitization scholars call “audience acceptance,” in which security narratives become influential once they are accepted and reproduced by the public. In contemporary securitization theory, threat narratives gain power not only because political elites promote them, but also because they resonate with segments of society that perceive demographic shifts, economic competition, or cultural change as destabilizing forces. This dynamic is further discussed in The US Deportation System: History, Impacts, and New Empirical Research (2025). Threat narratives gain power not simply because political elites articulate them, but because they resonate with segments of the public who perceive demographic change, economic competition, or cultural transformation as destabilizing forces. This dynamic is reflected in recent public opinion research on immigration enforcement in sensitive locations. A national survey conducted by In polarized political environments, such narratives become self-reinforcing. Media ecosystems amplify selective incidents, transforming isolated events into generalized patterns of perceived insecurity.

Over time, repeated exposure to such framing can normalize the assumption that migration inherently carries risk. The boundary between exceptional emergency and routine governance begins to blur. Once migration is widely understood as a security matter, resistance to enforcement expansion becomes politically costly, further entrenching securitized logic within institutional practice.

From Expansion to Institutionalization

Securitization becomes entrenched when embedded in bureaucratic structures. Evidence from The Landscape of Immigration Detention in the United States (2018) shows that detention capacity expanded dramatically over the past three decades, creating a dense nationwide enforcement infrastructure.

The growth of interior enforcement programs is examined in The Impact of Interior Immigration Enforcement on the Lives of Undocumented Immigrants (2024), which highlights how federal–local cooperation integrated immigration control into routine policing practices. Programs such as 287(g) blurred distinctions between civil immigration law and criminal enforcement.

The longer legislative trajectory of enforcement escalation is traced in From IIRIRA to Trump: Connecting the Dots to the Current U.S. Immigration Policy Crisis (2018), which documents how policy reforms steadily broadened deportation authority and normalized detention expansion.

What emerges is not a temporary reaction to crisis but a durable enforcement architecture. Securitization is no longer rhetorical; it is institutionalized through budgets, detention contracts, and interagency cooperation.

Politics of Fear and Executive Performance

Immigration enforcement also operates as political theater. Executive Spectacle Policing: Protest, Immigration, and Lessons from the Performance of State Power in the Trump Era (2025) describes enforcement actions as public displays of executive strength designed to convey authority and decisiveness.

Media amplification plays a crucial role in this process. Highly publicized raids and deportations circulate images of state control. Enforcement becomes visible reassurance to supporters that perceived threats are being managed.

Yet empirical research complicates the narrative linking immigrants to crime. Debunking the Myth of Immigrants and Crime (2020) finds limited evidence supporting claims that immigrants increase criminal activity. The persistence of threat framing therefore relies more on political communication than on statistical reality.

Language contributes symbolically. Beliefs and Opinions about “Illegal” and “Undocumented” Immigrants (2025) shows that terminology alone does not significantly change public attitudes, but reflects partisan alignment. Words signal identity more than they transform perception.

Together, these dynamics reveal how fear operates as a political resource. Enforcement is justified not only through law but through spectacle and narrative reinforcement.

Human Security and Intergenerational Consequences

Research on local immigration enforcement has also identified measurable educational consequences. ICE at the Door, Tests on the Floor: Student Achievement and Local Immigration Enforcement (2025) found that large-scale ICE arrest operations were associated with declining standardized test scores among Hispanic students, particularly in communities directly exposed to immigration enforcement activities. The study suggests that fear, stress, and disruptions within immigrant households can negatively affect students’ academic performance.

The consequences of immigration enforcement affect not only undocumented youth but also U.S. citizen children living in immigrant households. The same study suggests that increased absenteeism, stress, and fear within these communities can negatively affect students’ educational performance and contribute to broader intergenerational consequences. As a result, immigration enforcement produces indirect but tangible disruptions that may hinder long-term educational outcomes.

Broader psychological consequences are documented in The Impact of Immigration and Customs Enforcement on Immigrant Health (2011), which reports heightened anxiety, social withdrawal, and distrust toward public institutions. Fear extends beyond legal status and reshapes everyday life.

From a human security perspective, these findings raise normative concerns. As argued in The New Security Studies and Soft Power (2011), security should not be confined to state survival but encompass emancipation and individual well-being. When enforcement policies generate structural educational and psychological harm, the meaning of security becomes contested.

Conclusion: Competing Logics of Security

The surge in ICE arrests following the 2024 election reflects more than policy recalibration. It reveals how migration has been securitized, embedded in institutional practices, and normalized through political performance.

Territorial disparities demonstrate that enforcement intensity reflects partisan governance. Detention expansion shows bureaucratic entrenchment. Public spectacle reinforces narratives of threat. Empirical research reveals measurable social costs.

Migration governance thus becomes a site of competing security logics. One prioritizes sovereignty, control, and deterrence. The other emphasizes dignity, stability, and long-term social cohesion. The central question is not whether security matters, but whose security is prioritized—and whether the pursuit of state-centered security ultimately undermines the human foundations upon which it depends.

References

Ong, P., Ong, J., & Pech, C. (2025, July 30). State variations in ICE arrests. UCLA Center for Neighborhood Knowledge. https://knowledge.luskin.ucla.edu/2025/07/30/state-variations-in-ice-arrests-following-the-2024-election/

Ong, P., & Ong, J. (2025, September). ICE arrests in California and Texas: Polarized politics and outcomes. UCLA Center for Neighborhood Knowledge. https://knowledge.luskin.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/UCLA_CNK_ICE_Arrests_CA_TX_Sept2025.pdf

Nyman, J. (2023). Securitization. In P. D. Williams & M. McDonald (Eds.), Security studies: An introduction (4th ed., pp. 219–242). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003247821-9

Ryo, E., & Peacock, I. (2018). The landscape of immigration detention in the United States. American Immigration Council. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/the_landscape_of_immigration_detention_in_the_united_states.pdf

Hacker, K., Chu, J., Leung, C., Marra, R., Pirie, A., Brahimi, M., English, M., Beckmann, J., Acevedo-Garcia, D., & Marlin, R. P. (2011). The impact of Immigration and Customs Enforcement on immigrant health: Perceptions of immigrants in Everett, Massachusetts, USA. Social Science & Medicine, 73(4), 586–594. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.06.007

Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2004). Regions and powers: The structure of international security. Cambridge University Press.

Wong, T. K., & Shklyan, N. (2024). The impact of interior immigration enforcement on the lives of undocumented immigrants. The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics, 6(3), 669–687. https://doi.org/10.1017/rep.2024.19

Zhirkov, K., & Brehm, R. H. (2025). Beliefs and opinions about “illegal” and “undocumented” immigrants: Conceptual replication of a null result. Research and Politics, July-September 2025, 1–5. https://doi.org/10.1177/20531680251355233

Sorg, E. T. (2025). Executive spectacle policing: Protest, immigration, and lessons from the performance of state power in the Trump era. Policing and Society. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2025.2535670

Al-Rasheed, M. A. A., & Al-Saeedi, U. M. B. (2023). Modern Schools of Thought in Security Studies. Migration Letters, 20(S5), 646–660.

Bennett, C., Graves, V., & Meadows, B. (2025). ICE at the Door, Tests on the Floor: Student Achievement and Local Immigration Enforcement. RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 11(4), 104–122. https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2025.11.4.05

Kerwin, D. (2018). From IIRIRA to Trump: Connecting the Dots to the Current US Immigration Policy Crisis. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 6(3), 192-204. https://doi.org/10.1177/2331502418786718

Reshad, A. (2011). The new Security Studies and Soft power. Journal of American Science, 7(12), 1031-1036.

American Immigration Council. (2024). Debunking the myth of immigrants and crime (Fact Sheet). https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/debunking_the_myth_of_immigrants_and_crime.pdf

Blackburn, C. C., & Callaghan, T. (2025). U.S. public opinion about immigration enforcement in sensitive locations. Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health, 28(1), 9–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-025-01772-0

Patler, C., & Jones, B. (2025). The US deportation system: History, impacts, and new empirical research. RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences, 11(4), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.7758/RSF.2025.11.4.01

From Penetrated System to Strategic Uncertainty: The Iran War and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Security Order

From Penetrated System to Strategic Uncertainty: The Iran War and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Security Order

Apr 1, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 7 | April 2026

Authors:

Broto Wardoyo – Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia; Principal Nenggala Research

 

Summary

For decades, the Middle East operated as a “penetrated regional system,” with the United States serving as the ultimate stabilizer. However, the ongoing war signals a fundamental transformation. The US is no longer a reliable guarantor but increasingly a source of volatility, driven by retrenchment and shifting global priorities that treat the Middle East as secondary. This commentary identifies three sequential shifts; first, external powers, particularly the US, have shifted from stabilizers to catalysts of escalation through unpredictable, reactive interventions rather than sustained crisis management. Second, Gulf states’ security guarantees are eroding as their long-standing American patron becomes unreliable, forcing strategic reassessment. Third, Iran’s attacks on infrastructure reveal that Gulf security requires protection beyond the military sphere. Consequently, regional actors are diversifying security partnerships beyond the US and emphasizing regional diplomacy, gradually establishing greater autonomy despite inherent instability.

Keywords: Middle East, Iran, Gulf States, the United States, Security Arrangement, Asymmetric Strategy

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Introduction

For decades, the Middle East has been understood through the lens of a penetrated regional system (Brown, 1984). In such a system, regional conflicts rarely remain local but are deeply entangled with external powers, whose involvement is either invited by local actors or imposed through broader geopolitical competition. This pattern has long defined the region’s security architecture: local rivalries escalate into proxy conflicts, while stability, however fragile, is ultimately underwritten by external guarantors, particularly the United States in the post-Cold War era.

The ongoing war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran signals a fundamental disruption of this logic. Rather than reinforcing external stabilization, the conflict reveals a transformation in how security is produced, contested, and perceived. Three interrelated shifts are particularly significant: the changing role of external powers as sources of instability, the erosion of credible security guarantees, and the strategic recalibration of regional actors.

 

The Changing Role of External Powers: From Stabilizer to Catalyst of Escalation

First, the war shows that external powers are no longer merely stabilizers or neutral arbiters but can act as direct catalysts of escalation. The US’s involvement, particularly through strikes on Iranian targets, illustrates a departure from its earlier posture of managed engagement.

During earlier periods, Washington sought to contain conflicts, balancing deterrence with restraint to avoid escalation. This approach was evident in its long-standing containment strategy and, more recently, in the Obama administration’s reliance on diplomacy and calibrated pressure to avert both war and nuclear proliferation (Takeyh, 2006; Parsi, 2017; Nazareth, 2019). Even in moments of acute tension, the US policy prioritized de-escalation and direct engagement, reflecting a commitment to managing rather than intensifying conflict. However, policy shifts under the Trump administration marked a clear departure. By abandoning the JCPOA and adopting a “maximum pressure” strategy, Washington moved beyond containment toward rolling back Iranian influence, embedding coercion at the center of its policy and increasing the risk of broader instability (Simon, 2018; Nazareth, 2019).

This shift is primarily driven by changes in the US global priorities, even as domestic pressures remain relevant. Scholarship on retrenchment suggests that great powers facing relative decline recalibrate grand strategy by reducing commitments in peripheral regions and reallocating resources to more critical theaters (MacDonald & Parent, 2018). Rather than signaling collapse, retrenchment reflects an effort to align ends with means. In parallel, Posen (2007) argues that the United States should limit military activism abroad and focus on core strategic interests, particularly amid intensifying great power competition. Within this framework, the Middle East is increasingly treated as a secondary theater. This reorientation is reflected in withdrawal patterns such as Afghanistan, which indicate resource reallocation rather than battlefield failure (Wardoyo, 2024).

However, retrenchment carries significant implications. Reduced engagement diminishes the capacity for sustained crisis management and encourages a more selective, often reactive, use of force. The result is a paradox: while retrenchment aims to preserve long-term power, it weakens the US’s stabilizing role in regions like the Middle East. What emerges is not disengagement but uneven, episodic intervention, less predictable and more prone to generating instability. In this sense, retrenchment does not remove the United States from the region; it transforms its presence into a more volatile force.

Consequently, the US’s actions appear increasingly reactive and less anchored in a coherent long-term strategy. For regional actors, particularly Gulf states, this creates a paradox: the power that once functioned as the ultimate stabilizer is now perceived as a source of volatility. The Iranian case thus underscores the fragility and possible erosion of the US’s role as a reliable security guarantor.

 

The New Reality for Gulf Security

For decades, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have anchored their security strategies on American protection. This arrangement was not only military but deeply political, reflecting a patron–client relationship in which the US guarantees formed the cornerstone of regional order. Following the Gulf War, Washington institutionalized this role through forward deployments, defense agreements, and extensive arms transfers, embedding Gulf militaries within a the US-led security architecture (Roberts, 2025). This dependence was both material and structural, shaping doctrines, procurement patterns, and regime security strategies. As recent scholarship notes, Gulf security has long rested on this asymmetrical reliance (Bakir, 2025). Yet, as argued by Kausikan et al (2023), shifting global priorities and the US retrenchment have begun to erode the credibility of these guarantees, prompting Gulf states to reassess their dependence and explore alternatives.

What is unfolding is not simply a weakening of the US’s commitment but the gradual unravelling of a deeply embedded security architecture. As Washington recalibrates its global posture, its commitment to Middle Eastern security appears increasingly conditional. Regional allies now face an uncomfortable reality: the guarantor they have long depended on may no longer be willing, or able, to provide the same level of protection. The Iran war amplifies this uncertainty. If the US intervention can trigger escalation without delivering decisive outcomes, and if strategic focus lies elsewhere, the credibility of its guarantees inevitably comes into question. This is not merely perceptual but structural: the reliability of external security provision is now contested.

 

Iran’s Asymmetric Escalation: Cheap Offense, Costly defense

Third, and perhaps most consequentially, Iran’s response introduces a new dimension to regional security calculations. By targeting not only military assets but also economic and civilian infrastructure, Iran expands conflict beyond conventional boundaries. Evidence shows that Iranian strikes have systematically targeted critical infrastructure across the Gulf, including energy facilities, ports, and logistical nodes; prioritizing disruption over battlefield dominance (Clarke, Hammad, & Wajid, 2026). This reflects a strategy of asymmetric escalation, in which Iran uses relatively low-cost tools such as drones to impose disproportionately high costs on adversaries with far more expensive defense systems (Wardoyo, 2026; Düz, 2026).

The result is a “cheap offense versus costly defense” dynamic that structurally disadvantages Gulf states, forcing them to absorb repeated shocks despite reliance on advanced Western systems. In this context, U.S. security guarantees become increasingly hollow: rather than deterring attacks, they turn Gulf states into frontline targets, as Iran strikes the US-aligned territories to raise the costs of intervention (Clarke, Hammad, & Wajid, 2026). Far from stabilizing the region, this dynamic intensifies vulnerability and exposes the limits of external protection.

Moreover, this development is particularly alarming for Gulf states. Their economic models remain structurally dependent on hydrocarbon activity, which continues to shape growth, fiscal stability, and overall performance despite diversification efforts (IMF, 2025). At the same time, these economies are deeply embedded in global trade and logistics networks, where ports, energy flows, and re-export systems serve as critical nodes linking the region to global markets. These networks are not only central to growth but also highly exposed to disruption (Schneider, 2026). This dependence is reinforced by governance models that rely on externally connected economic systems and state-led coordination of key sectors (Al-Kuwari, 2026).

The result is an economic architecture that is both highly integrated and inherently vulnerable. Disruptions to energy infrastructure, logistics hubs, or trade flows can cascade through the entire system. In this context, the prospect that these assets could become targets raises fundamental questions about deterrence and defense. Security arrangements centered on military protection alone are increasingly inadequate to address vulnerabilities that are economic, systemic, and embedded in global interdependence.

 

Conclusion

Regional actors are therefore compelled to rethink their strategic positioning. Some may pursue hedging strategies by diversifying security partnerships beyond the US, including limited engagement with China and Russia, or by investing in indigenous defense capabilities to enhance autonomy. At the same time, renewed emphasis on regional diplomacy reflects a recognition that reliance on external guarantors alone is no longer sufficient. Stability may increasingly depend on direct engagement among local actors, including long-standing rivals.

Taken together, these shifts suggest that the Middle East is moving away from the classic model of a penetrated system toward a more complex and uncertain configuration. External powers remain influential, but their roles are less predictable and more contested. Local actors are gaining agency but also bearing greater responsibility. This transition is inherently unstable: the absence of a clear stabilizing force increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation. Yet the diversification of strategies and emergence of new diplomatic initiatives also open pathways toward a more autonomous regional order.

In this sense, the Middle East is no longer simply a penetrated system. It is becoming a laboratory of strategic uncertainty, where old patterns persist, but new logics are taking shape.

Hedging in Cyberspace: Indonesia Between U.S.–China Cyber Competition

Hedging in Cyberspace: Indonesia Between U.S.–China Cyber Competition

Mar 30, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 6 | March 2026

Authors:

Mochammad Jose Akmal – Government Science Graduate, Universitas Diponegoro

 

Summary

Indonesia’s cyber posture is best understood not as a binary alignment between Washington and Beijing, but as an ongoing effort to preserve strategic autonomy within a deeply transnational digital ecosystem—where infrastructure, vendors, data flows, and intelligence dependencies are globally intertwined. This autonomy is increasingly strained by a threat environment that is expansive, persistent, and operationally significant, extending well beyond what any single vendor report can capture. The 2026 analysis by Unit 42 is valuable insofar as it identifies a state-aligned espionage cluster, TGR-STA-1030, which compromised at least 70 organisations across 37 countries and conducted reconnaissance activities spanning 155 countries, including Indonesia. However, this report should be treated as a single empirical data point rather than as the primary evidentiary anchor. Broader evidence—drawn from publicly reported Indonesian incidents, national disclosures, and regional cybersecurity assessments—demonstrates that Indonesia has experienced repeated and measurable cyber disruptions affecting government systems and critical public services.

Keywords: Cybersecurity, Cyber diplomacy, Strategic hedging, Cyber resilience

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State-Backed Cyber Threats and Global Exposure

A more grounded reading of Indonesia’s threat environment is not that a single advanced actor is targeting the country, but rather that it operates within a broader, constantly active ecosystem of cyber espionage, criminal activity, and opportunistic attacks. In that sense, the risk is less about one persistent threat and more about continuous exposure across a wide attack surface.

Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 findings reflect this pattern. The group tracked as TGR-STA-1030 did not rely on particularly novel techniques. Instead, it combined phishing—often using government-related lures such as ministry restructuring narratives—with malicious archives hosted overseas and the exploitation of known vulnerabilities rather than zero-days. It also used widely available tools such as Cobalt Strike, VShell, and web shells, targeting services such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft OMI, and SAP Solution Manager, as well as vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-11580 in e-passport and e-visa systems. What stands out here is not sophistication, but accessibility. These are methods and tools that are well understood and widely used. That shifts the focus away from rare, high-end exploits and toward more persistent structural issues—exposed services, weak identity management, and slow patching cycles. In practice, those gaps create just as much risk, especially when they affect systems tied to public administration and national infrastructure.

Indonesian government data support this broader picture. BSSN’s 2023 report records extremely high volumes of anomalous activity, including hundreds of millions of network anomalies, millions of APT-related and ransomware events, and hundreds of confirmed incidents. It also highlights significant exposure on the dark web affecting hundreds of stakeholders, including government entities. The public administration sector appears most affected, with recurring issues such as web defacement, ransomware, and data breaches.

Data from Kominfo-CSIRT in 2024 points in the same direction. It shows sustained anomaly traffic at scale and multiple incidents within a single ministry, where malicious file injection was the most common attack type. None of these figures clearly points to a single actor or campaign. Instead, they show something more structural: compromise is frequent, distributed, and ongoing. That makes the challenge less about attribution and more about resilience—reducing exposure, improving baseline security practices, and treating cyber risk as a constant condition rather than an occasional disruption.

A clear illustration of these risks is the 2024 ransomware attack on Indonesia’s national data centre. According to Reuters, the breach disrupted immigration and airport services, affected more than 230 public agencies across the archipelago, and involved a ransom demand of about $8 million (Rp135.5 billion). Officials further indicated that 98% of the data in one compromised facility had not been backed up. This incident is significant because it demonstrates that cyber threats have escalated to the point of affecting national security and sovereignty. The consequences extended beyond technical disruption to include service outages, administrative paralysis, reputational harm to the government, and substantial recovery costs. It underscores that cyber policy should not be treated merely as an abstract issue of information security, but as a critical component of state resilience and governance.

 

Geopolitical Context and Why Attribution Must Be Handled Carefully

Indonesia’s cyber posture is shaped by great-power rivalry, but attribution is more complex than political rhetoric suggests. Technical attribution identifies infrastructure, tools, and behaviour; legal attribution assesses whether those facts meet standards for state responsibility; political attribution is the public act of naming an actor. These are distinct. Under international law, political attribution alone does not justify countermeasures—state responsibility requires an internationally wrongful act attributable to a state. Although Articles 4–11 of the ILC’s ARSIWA reflect customary law, cyber operations’ use of proxies, obfuscation, and layered infrastructure makes evidentiary certainty difficult to establish.

This caution is especially important for Indonesia. Diplomatic responses to suspected state-backed activity should rest on evidence robust enough to withstand domestic, partner, and international scrutiny. That does not require silence, but rather calibrated responses: technical mitigation, selective disclosure, bilateral demarches, regional consultation, and, only then, explicit political attribution if the evidentiary threshold is met. Debates reflected in the Tallinn Manual highlight how contested the boundaries are between espionage, sovereignty violations, and unlawful coercion in cyberspace. Accordingly, claims of state sponsorship should not be presumed without clearly articulated and independently justified evidence.

 

What Hedging Looks Like In Practice

Hedging should be treated as a concrete portfolio strategy, not a vague commitment to “balance.” For Indonesia, this means sustaining cyber cooperation with both the United States and China while ensuring neither becomes indispensable in a way that would constrain policy autonomy. In practice, that requires diversified procurement across ecosystems, dual-track training for government and CERT personnel, conditional intelligence sharing that preserves data sovereignty, and rules that avoid vendor lock-in. Interoperability and auditability should be non-negotiable procurement criteria. These measures translate hedging from rhetoric into an actionable governance model.

Indonesia already has the foundations for this approach. Public records indicate cyber cooperation with both Washington and Beijing, including a US–Indonesia letter of intent and an Indonesia–China MoU on cybersecurity capacity and technology. While this does not imply policy equivalence, it demonstrates that Jakarta maintains multiple external cyber channels. The central policy issue, then, is not whether Indonesia hedges, but whether that logic is embedded in procurement, training, and incident-response frameworks—so that when partner expectations diverge, Indonesia preserves option value and safeguards its policy autonomy.

 

Private-Sector and Supply-chain Dynamics

Any serious cyber strategy for Indonesia must start with a simple premise: resilience is built on a diverse ecosystem—government, telcos, cloud providers, integrators, academia, and private security firms. The state can set strategy and legal baselines, but operational control—telemetry, patching, identity, and incident response—largely sits with private actors. Indonesian business guidance already reflects this shift: Kadin’s 2025 white paper prioritises critical infrastructure resilience, governance, talent, public–private partnerships, standardisation, and strengthening the domestic cybersecurity industry—reducing dependence on foreign tools and opaque vendor ecosystems.

Procurement, therefore, becomes cyber policy. CISA frames ICT supply-chain risk management as core to resilience, with tools like the KEV catalogue to prioritise actively exploited vulnerabilities, while highlighting phishing and supply-chain compromise as persistent entry points. For Indonesia, this translates into embedding vendor vetting, code provenance, patch SLAs, privileged-access controls, and audit rights into public procurement—especially for government systems, aviation, data centres, and critical infrastructure.

Indonesia’s own incidents reinforce this approach. Kominfo-CSIRT’s 2024 report shows response efforts depended on forensics, backup restoration, endpoint protection, vulnerability assessment, and coordination with BSSN, law enforcement, and the wider cybersecurity community. Resilience, therefore, is not just prevention—it requires robust recovery architecture, disciplined backups, segmentation, and a tested incident-response capability.

 

ASEAN and the Limits of Regional Multilateralism

ASEAN is a pragmatic platform for reducing bilateral exposure, but it should not be overstated. Its cyber strategy offers useful institutional scaffolding—such as the ASEAN CERT Maturity Framework, prospective regional CERT cooperation, and coordinated incident-response mechanisms. However, persistent capability asymmetries, uneven public–private information sharing, and limited transparency constrain effectiveness.

Indonesia should therefore engage ASEAN selectively, focusing on achievable outcomes: standardised incident taxonomies, baseline CERT coordination, joint exercises, and norms of responsible behaviour rather than rapid strategic convergence. Multilateralism helps dilute the influence of any single external power and expands Indonesia’s ability to shape rules collectively.

That said, effective regionalism requires more than rhetorical support for “ASEAN centrality.” It depends on harmonised incident definitions, agreed emergency coordination channels, and routine interoperability exercises that incorporate the private sector, reflecting the operational reality that cyber defence extends beyond government institutions.

 

Policy Recommendations

Indonesia should spell out what “hedging” actually means in its cyber policies. In practice, that requires clarity on what kinds of cooperation are allowed, what data can be shared, which technologies are acceptable, and where the limits lie. These boundaries should not remain abstract—they need to be enforceable through auditable contracts with vendors and by ensuring the state retains control over critical logs and metadata. At the same time, more capabilities should be built at home. Universities, CSIRTs, and local firms can take on a larger role in training, digital forensics, and secure procurement so that resilience does not depend entirely on external platforms. This direction is already consistent with patterns seen in public-sector incidents, BSSN priorities, and the private sector’s growing focus on resilience.

It is also important to distinguish between cooperation and dependence. Working with the United States on intelligence can improve early warning and incident response, while engagement with China on infrastructure may still be useful under clear and transparent rules. The key is that neither relationship should limit Indonesia’s room to act—data sovereignty, the ability to switch vendors, and the avoidance of concentration in critical systems must remain intact. In that sense, hedging is less about staying neutral and more about preserving flexibility under changing conditions.

At the regional level, capacity-building should focus on what is realistically achievable. ASEAN initiatives—such as joint exercises, shared CERT practices, and cross-border protocols—still matter, but progress is likely to come from narrower steps first. Common training programs, shared terminology, and baseline standards for public institutions and critical infrastructure operators within Indonesia are more practical in the near term. Compared to an ambitious, fully integrated regional framework, this incremental approach is more workable and better aligned with ASEAN’s institutional limits.

 

Conclusion

Indonesia’s cyber challenge extends well beyond its position between the United States and China. Its digital infrastructure faces a layered threat environment that includes espionage, ransomware, phishing, exploitation of known vulnerabilities, and supply chain-related risks. Evidence from BSSN, Kominfo-CSIRT, Reuters reporting on the national data centre attack, CISA guidance, and Unit 42’s global campaign converges on a clear conclusion: cyber resilience is now a core issue of national security and state capacity. Hedging remains a viable strategy, but only if it is operationalised through disciplined procurement, mature incident response, legal clarity around attribution, and regional cooperation that reinforces—rather than compromises—strategic autonomy.

India’s Multi-Alignment Compass: Insight from the 2026 Raisina Dialogue

India’s Multi-Alignment Compass: Insight from the 2026 Raisina Dialogue

Mar 26, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 5 | March 2026

Authors:

Chaula Rininta Anindya – Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia

 

Summary

India’s premier geopolitical forum, the Raisina Dialogue – organised by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in partnership with the Ministry of External Affairs – underscored New Delhi’s commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment amid global turbulence. This commentary draws from the author’s personal and independent observation as a 2026 Raisina Young Fellow. It examines India’s foreign policy through the lens of this year’s Dialogue. First, it analyses debates on India’s rise via the US’s offensive realism and India’s Kautilyan politics. Then, it traces India’s foreign policy evolution from non-alignment to multi-alignment, as shown by its ties with Israel and Iran. Finally, it explores India’s statecraft as embodied in this year’s theme Saṁskāra (assertion, accommodation, advancement).

Keywords: India, Raisina Dialogue, Strategic Autonomy, Multi-alignment, Iran-Israel War

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Introduction

In early March, India hosted its flagship geopolitics and geoeconomic conference, the 2026 Raisina Dialogue. This year, the Raisina Dialogue was held just a few days after the US-Israel War on Iran. Despite the thousands of cancellations due to the airspace closure and the ongoing conflict, 2,700 participants from 110 countries flew to New Delhi to attend in person, underscoring India and the conference’s significance. The 2026 Raisina Dialogue’s theme, Saṁskāra (an Indian philosophical concept) – assertion, accommodation, advancement – not only reflects the current geopolitical conditions but also India’s attempt to assert its position in the world.

The 2026 Raisina Dialogue invited Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, as the Keynote Speaker. Stubb, who has just released his book “The Triangle of Power”, reiterated that the Global South will determine the future of the world order. Stubb added India, as a major power, will be a, if not the, major force, whether the world will tilt towards conflictual multipolarity or a cooperative multilateral world order. An intriguing argument coming from a president from the Global North.

As a politician-cum-scholar, Stubb proposed that India play a greater role in maintaining the world order through, at least, two proposals. First, he called for New Delhi to host a transformative moment akin to San Francisco in 1945, bringing world leaders together to reimagine international institutions through a spirit of genuine cooperation. Second, he advocated for expanding the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) permanent membership to include more representatives from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, with a permanent seat secured for India. The audience responded with applause to the proposal on the prospect of India’s permanent UNSC seat. Stubb’s message was clear; India, as a major power, bears significant responsibility for bridging divides between nations across different hemispheres.

India understands its pivotal position in navigating the uncertain and changing world order. The 2026 Raisina Dialogue demonstrates India’s determination to determine its own growth and maintain strategic autonomy in its foreign policy approach.

 

US Offensive Realism vs India’s Kautilyan Politics

On the first day of the 2026 Raisina Dialogue, the US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, as the US head of delegation, warned India that the US will not replicate its mistake as it made with China two decades ago:

“But again, India should understand that we are not going to make the same mistakes with India that we made with China 20 years ago in terms of saying, we are going to let you develop all these markets, and then, the next thing we know, you are beating us in a lot of commercial things”

This message demonstrated the essence of U.S. offensive realism’s grand strategy. While Landau did not dismiss potential U.S.-India cooperation, he framed it within an “America First” paradigm, whereby any partnership would prioritise American interests. In this vein, the message can be reinterpreted as signalling the US’s intention to check India’s ascent through selective cooperation, ensuring it does not threaten American hegemony.

On the last day of the Raisina Dialogue, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar asserted that India’s rise is unstoppable and will be determined by India. This remark can be seen as Jaishankar’s response to Landau’s statement. Jaishankar’s statement was firm and demonstrated India’s resolve to steer its economic growth and foreign policy independently, rejecting external dictates amid global pressures. This statement also reflects India’s Kautilyan politics, an ancient Indian strategic thinker, in navigating the domestic and international politics. Kautilyan politics underscores the importance of political and economic power as a source of state security. Therefore, India’s growth will not be directed by others, but by itself, based on the benefits for its own people. Such approaches are believed to create internal stability, a prerequisite for strength and power. Consequently, India also directs its own path in alliance, leveraging a flexible and pragmatic diplomacy in a multipolar world, driven by the national interest.

 

 

India’s Strategic Autonomy and Multi-alignment: Israel and Iran’s presence

As one of the pioneers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India has clearly shifted to a multi-alignment foreign policy. Minister Jaishankar has also mentioned the country’s preference for a multi-alignment approach in his book, “The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World.” Minister Jaishankar (2020) wrote:

“Taking off on non-alignment, it is sometimes useful to speak of multi-alignment. It appears more energetic and participative as compared to an earlier posture of abstention or non-involvement.”

Jaishankar further reiterated that the approach aims for “strategic convergence instead of tactical convenience.” The multi-alignment approach could also be seen in the 2026 Raisina Dialogue. After the war broke out in the Middle East, all attention was on the tensions between Israel and Iran. Raisina Dialogue proved to be more than a conference when it managed to invite the Foreign Minister of Israel, virtually, Gideon Saar and Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh. On the first day of the dialogue, Saar highlighted that the goal of this war was to remove the existential threat in the long run, whereas on the second day, Khatibzadeh stressed that it was an existential war. Both countries claimed that they are fighting a war to ensure their survival. India provided an avenue for the two countries to affirm their stance on the global stage.

One might argue that India is leaning toward Israel following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel before the war occurred. The visit also gained criticism from a leading member of the major opposition party, defining the visit as “shameful” and “ill-timed”. India’s relations with Israel have indeed significantly improved under Prime Minister Modi, who became the first Indian Prime Minister to make an official visit to Israel back in 2017. During his recent trip to Israel, Modi underscored the solidarity towards Israel under the pretext of “ancient civilisation ties.” India could not deny its relations with Israel, as Israel has become a critical partner in defence technology development. 

The presence of Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, however, signifies the nuance embedded in India’s foreign policy approach: strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. Iran’s acceptance of the invitation hinged on India demonstrating its commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment; a delicate equilibrium that allows New Delhi to deepen ties with Israel while refraining from outright hostility toward Tehran. This balancing act was most visible when India authorised the docking of Iranian warships at its ports following the US-Israel attack on Iran, claiming that it was “the right thing to do” and a form of “humanitarian gesture.”

Once again, India demonstrated its multi-alignment approach amid escalating regional tensions. While other nations scrambled to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, two Indian naval vessels safely passed the strait, thanks to close dialogue with Iranian counterparts. This case highlights Iran’s confidence in India.

 

Conclusion

The 2026 Raisina Dialogue showed India’s deliberate pivot toward strategic autonomy and multi-alignment in an increasingly fractured world order. The presence of world leaders and their candid dialogues underscored the platform’s leverage as a genuine forum for diverse geopolitical perspectives. The fundamental essence of India’s Saṁskāra – this year’s theme – is well represented in the dialogue. Through this dialogue, India strongly asserted its identity as an independent nation with a strategic autonomy whose path could not be dictated by others. The dialogue also accommodated different views through frank conversations among world leaders, showcasing India’s balanced engagement with global powers. Lastly, the dialogue embraces all nations to advance together with India through constructive dialogues amid rapid global shifts. Saṁskāra is thus not merely a philosophical theme but a blueprint for India’s statecraft in a multipolar world.

 

 

Acknowledgement

This article is the author’s personal reflection from attending the 2026 Raisina Dialogue as a Raisina Young Fellow. These views represent independent analysis and do not imply endorsement by any organisation or government.

A Troubling Departure: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Colonial Question

A Troubling Departure: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Colonial Question

Mar 25, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 4 | March 2026

Authors:

Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia Lalisang – Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia; member of “South Solidarity, Development, and Transformation for Global Justice” Research Cluster

 

Summary

Indonesia’s recent foreign policy conduct under President Prabowo reveals three alarming tendencies. Jakarta orbits the major powers. It puts aside the Palestinian voice by joining the Trump-led Board of Peace. It treats its domestic audience as something to be managed, rather than heard. Together, these reproduce coloniality both externally and internally. This is a troubling departure from Indonesia’s own founding principle: anti-colonialism. Three alternatives are proposed: de-centering major powers to reclaim space for ASEAN and South-South partnership, articulating a durable strategy for contributing to Palestinian freedom, and treating the people as stakeholders rather than spectators. Imagining these alternatives is an act of refusal to be dominated by the government’s overwhelming discourse about what the country’s foreign policy can and cannot be.

Keywords: Indonesia’s foreign policy, anti-colonialism, decolonial approach, coloniality.



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Not many countries enshrine their anti-colonial stance in their constitution. Indonesia is an exception for putting that in its very first sentence. It says that independence is the right of all nations and that colonialism must be abolished. As the host of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference, anti-colonial solidarity further became central to Indonesia’s foreign policy profile. What has been happening lately in how Jakarta conducts its foreign policy is a troubling departure.

Under President Prabowo, Indonesia’s foreign policy has been primarily oriented toward the major powers. Bilateral exchanges with China, Russia, France, Australia, and now the United States crowd the diplomatic calendar. President Prabowo appears keen to position Indonesia among the strong, as if recognition from the centre of global power is what makes this country matter.

Indonesia has joined the Trump-led Board of Peace. It accepted the invitation to sit at a table where external powers decide the future of Palestine without a single Palestinian present. It participated in someone else’s project without a clear strategy of its own. There is no roadmap for what Jakarta would do within the Board to walk with Palestinians toward their freedom. The approach seems to be: join first, figure out the rest later.

This, among other things, is why the decision to join the Board has drawn public criticism. Defending the decision, the government says foreign policy requires discretion and that not everything can be disclosed. President Prabowo further responded by explaining his decision to former foreign ministers, academics, experts, and Muslim leaders. The people, meanwhile, were left as spectators rather than stakeholders. They watched how most of those intermediary elites eventually spoke in favour of the government’s position after the meeting.

Taken together, these amount to a foreign policy that reproduces colonial structures both externally and internally. Jakarta put aside the Palestinian voice by surrendering its own voice to Washington, while seeking to silence dissenting internal voices by approaching the intermediary elites.

What would an alternative look like? I offer three proposals.

First, de-center the major powers. Relations with great powers matter and will continue to matter. However, Jakarta should not let them define the horizon of Indonesia’s foreign policy. There is ample room for deepening the ASEAN community, engagement with fellow developing nations and expanding South-South partnerships. Indonesia’s external affairs are too vast and its potential too great to be reduced to managing relationships with major powers. To that end, Indonesia has to reclaim the space that the gravitational pull of major powers has crowded out.

Second, articulate a clear strategy for how Indonesia contributes to Palestinian freedom. Indonesia’s consistent voting at the United Nations, humanitarian assistance, and refusal to recognise Israel are not nothing. However, after decades of invoking the Palestinian cause, Jakarta must have more than rhetoric. Jakarta should have a durable roadmap that is not hostage to the impulses of whoever sits in the presidential palace, and that reflects the constitutional commitment enshrined in the founding principles of the republic.

Third, treat the people as stakeholders. Jakarta should explain the reasoning behind foreign policy decisions directly to the people. In this regard, press conferences alone are insufficient without an acknowledgement that the people have a legitimate claim on how their country positions itself in the world. Channels should be open for civil society to also shape Indonesia’s foreign policy conduct.

These are proposals for attitudinal change. It is worth noting that attitudinal change alone will not dismantle the unequal power structure in which Indonesia is positioned globally, and in which the governing elites are positioned vis-à-vis the people internally. But this is where the work begins.

More work is needed to imagine an alternative outlook when the present insists there is none. It is an act of refusal to be dominated by the government’s overwhelming discourse about what the country’s foreign policy can and cannot be.

Remember, the first sentence of the constitution was an act of imagination. It was written when Indonesia was still fighting for its own survival. If the founders of Indonesia could imagine the abolition of colonialism from a position of weakness, Indonesia can certainly demand it from a position of independence.

Indonesia was once a champion of anti-colonial struggle. Today, the country is sleepwalking into reproducing coloniality at home and abroad. The least we can do is wake up and ask why.

 

Acknowledgement

This piece is the author’s reflection following participation in the 2026 Association of Asian Studies (AAS) Conference. The author is grateful to all those whose stimulating conversations and talks throughout the conference informed this writing. The views expressed here, however, remain solely the author’s own.

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