Latin America or Africa? Explaining Indonesia’s Selective Trade Deepening

Latin America or Africa? Explaining Indonesia’s Selective Trade Deepening

Feb 24, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 3 | February 2026

Authors:

Rachmasari Nur Al-Husin –Doctoral Student and Junior Fellow at Global South Solidarity, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia

 

Summary

Indonesia has prioritised trade diversification toward non-traditional partners within the framework of South–South cooperation. However, its trade diplomacy toward Latin America and Africa has developed unevenly. While comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs) have been concluded with Latin American partners, engagement with Africa remains largely confined to preferential trade agreements (PTAs), despite Africa’s stronger commodity complementarity and economic stability. This article argues that the divergence is driven less by economic fundamentals than by institutional comfort, political signalling, and policy learning effects. Latin America has served as a lower-risk environment for comprehensive trade engagement, while Africa remains primarily framed through development cooperation, limiting deeper trade integration. The article highlights the need to recalibrate Indonesia’s trade diplomacy toward Africa to achieve more coherent South-South engagement.

Keywords: Trade diplomacy, South-South cooperation, Non-traditional markets



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Introduction

Indonesia’s foreign economic policy has increasingly emphasised diversifying trade partners beyond traditional markets in East Asia, Europe, and North America. Within this agenda, Latin America and Africa are often grouped as non-traditional partners under the broader banner of South–South cooperation. Both regions are frequently described as “untapped markets,” each accounting for less than five per cent of Indonesia’s total exports (Sabaruddin, 2016). However, Indonesia’s trade diplomacy toward these two regions has evolved along sharply different trajectories.

While Indonesia has concluded and expanded comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs) with Latin American partners, most notably Chile, Peru, and MERCOSUR, its engagement with Africa remains largely confined to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, 2025). This divergence is puzzling. Africa offers stronger commodity complementarity with Indonesia, a growing consumer base, and comparatively stable post-pandemic economic growth. Latin America, by contrast, shares structural similarities with Indonesia’s export profile, often resulting in competitive rather than complementary trade relations.

This commentary argues that economic fundamentals do not primarily drive Indonesia’s deeper trade engagement with Latin America. Instead, it reflects a combination of institutional comfort, political signalling, and policy-learning effects that shape how Indonesia translates opportunities into binding trade commitments.

 

Economic Potential vs Policy Reality

From an economic standpoint, Africa appears to be the more promising partner for Indonesia’s trade expansion. Indonesia’s export structure, dominated by vegetable oils, paper products, light manufacturing, automotive components, and basic consumer goods, aligns closely with African import demand (UN Comtrade, 2025). Trade relations with Africa have also demonstrated relative resilience during periods of global economic disruption. During the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021), while Indonesia’s exports to several Latin American markets contracted sharply due to supply-chain disruptions and commodity price volatility, exports to key African partners such as South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria rebounded more quickly in 2021, supported by sustained demand for palm oil, pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods (UN Comtrade, 2025). Similarly, during the post-pandemic commodity price correction in 2022–2023, Indonesia maintained trade surpluses with several African partners, indicating relatively stable demand structures compared to more volatile Latin American markets.

Latin America presents a different economic profile. Many Latin American economies, like Indonesia, remain heavily reliant on primary commodities and resource-based exports. This structural similarity limits broad-based complementarity and confines trade to specific niches such as footwear, electronics, and selected manufactured goods (Ramana & Retnosari, 2018). As a result, Indonesia’s export portfolio in Latin America does not fully reflect its overall comparative advantages.

Macroeconomic indicators further underscore this contrast. Although Latin America’s aggregate nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) remains larger, African economies have displayed more stable real GDP growth and, in recent years, higher purchasing power parity (PPP) levels (International Monetary Fund, 2025). These trends suggest that Africa offers not only market potential but also greater resilience to external shocks.

Despite these indicators, economic potential has not translated into policy depth. Indonesia’s trade agreements with Africa remain limited in scope, while Latin America has become the focal point for comprehensive frameworks. This disconnect points to factors beyond economic rationality shaping Indonesia’s trade diplomacy.

 

Institutional Comfort and Policy Learning in Latin America

Indonesia’s deeper engagement with Latin America is best understood through the lens of institutional familiarity and policy learning. The Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA), formally signed in December 2017 and entering into force in August 2019, initially focused on trade in goods and was later expanded to include services and investment chapters. Since its implementation, IC-CEPA has functioned as a practical learning platform for Indonesian trade negotiators. The agreement offered a relatively manageable environment in which Indonesia could experiment with regulatory provisions, services liberalisation, and dispute settlement mechanisms (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, 2024).

Latin American partners also tend to possess regulatory structures and negotiation capacities that align more closely with Indonesia’s institutional preferences. This compatibility reduces transaction costs and implementation uncertainty, making comprehensive agreements appear less risky (Taufiqqurrachman & Handoyo, 2021). Over time, these experiences have generated a path-dependent logic. Once a CEPA framework proved workable in Latin America, extending similar arrangements to other countries in the region became both feasible and strategically attractive. For example, negotiation experiences from the IC-CEPA CEPA informed Indonesia’s subsequent engagement with Peru through the Indonesia-Peru CEPA (IP-CEPA), signed in 2018 and entering into force in 2021, as well as exploratory discussions with MERCOSUR. Regulatory templates, tariff-elimination schedules, and negotiation modalities developed in Chile were partially replicated in subsequent talks, illustrating how institutional learning generated incremental expansion within the same regional cluster.

Political signalling has further reinforced this trajectory. Deep trade agreements with Latin American partners allow Indonesia to project an image of openness, reform orientation, and commitment to high-standard trade governance. Such signalling strengthens Indonesia’s credibility not only in bilateral relations but also within wider global trade networks (Al-Husin & Virgianita, 2024). Latin America, in this sense, has become a relatively “safe arena” for Indonesia’s comprehensive trade diplomacy.

 

Africa: Strong Potential, Limited Policy Translation

Indonesia’s engagement with Africa has followed a markedly different path. Rather than being anchored in trade liberalisation, relations have historically emphasised political solidarity, development cooperation, and technical assistance (Suryanta & Patunru, 2023). Capacity-building programmes, infrastructure initiatives, and development forums dominate the bilateral agenda, reinforcing Africa’s position as a partner for cooperation rather than market integration.

While these initiatives strengthen diplomatic ties, they do not automatically translate into binding trade commitments. PTA concluded that African partners remain narrow in scope and lack the regulatory depth associated with CEPAs. Unlike comprehensive agreements, they do not substantially reshape market access, investment frameworks, or services trade.

Institutional fragmentation further complicates deeper engagement. Diverse regulatory regimes, uneven negotiation capacities, and implementation challenges increase the perceived risks of comprehensive agreements. Although the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a pathway toward market integration, Indonesia has yet to articulate a clear strategy for leveraging AfCFTA as a platform for deeper trade engagement (Asche, 2021).

Political symbolism also plays an ambivalent role. Africa occupies a central place in Indonesia’s diplomatic identity through the legacy of the Bandung Conference and South-South solidarity. However, this historical narrative often reinforces a development-oriented framing, inadvertently sidelining trade liberalisation as a policy priority (Heryadi, Darmastuti, & Rachman, 2024). As a result, Africa’s economic potential remains under-translated into Indonesia’s trade architecture.

 

Strategic Implications for Indonesia

Indonesia’s two-track approach to trade diplomacy carries important strategic implications (Tobing & Virgianita, 2020). Prioritising institutional comfort over economic opportunity risks underutilising Africa’s growing market potential, particularly as other emerging economies pursue deeper trade and investment frameworks on the continent. The continued separation between development cooperation and trade policy also limits coherence, reducing the effectiveness of Indonesia’s economic diplomacy.

To address this gap, Indonesia’s trade strategy would benefit from reframing Africa not merely as a development partner but as a trade-led opportunity. This requires integrating trade objectives into existing diplomatic platforms and aligning technical cooperation with longer-term market access goals. AfCFTA, in particular, offers a strategic entry point for phased and modular engagement that could gradually move beyond PTA-level commitments.

Equally important is strengthening institutional preparedness. Enhancing regulatory cooperation, negotiation capacity, and policy coordination would reduce perceived risks and enable Indonesia to pursue deeper agreements with greater confidence. Aligning the normative language of South-South solidarity with concrete trade objectives would also help ensure that political symbolism supports, rather than substitutes for, economic integration.

At the institutional level, coordination would need to be led primarily by the Ministry of Trade (Kemendag), particularly the Directorate General of International Trade Negotiations (Ditjen PPI), in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu), the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, and sectoral ministries such as Industry and Investment. Indonesian embassies in key African capitals would also play a crucial role in market intelligence and regulatory mapping. Stronger inter-ministerial coordination would reduce fragmentation and align development cooperation instruments with trade negotiation objectives.

 

Conclusion

Indonesia’s deeper trade diplomacy with Latin America reflects institutional familiarity, political signalling, and accumulated policy learning rather than superior economic fundamentals. Africa, despite offering stronger economic complementarity and greater stability, remains constrained by a development-oriented framing and institutional caution. Addressing this misalignment requires coordinated action among key stakeholders. The Ministry of Trade must lead negotiation recalibration, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reframing Africa within Indonesia’s economic diplomacy narrative. The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs should ensure cross-sectoral alignment, while Indonesian embassies and trade promotion centers must strengthen market intelligence. Engagement with private-sector actors, particularly exporters and industry associations, is equally critical to translate diplomatic intent into commercial outcomes. Without such stakeholder alignment, Indonesia’s South–South engagement risks remaining symbolic rather than structurally transformative.

 

References

Sabaruddin, S. S. (2016). Penguatan Diplomasi Ekonomi Indonesia Mendesain Clustering Tujuan Pasar Ekspor Indonesia: Pasar Tradisional vs Pasar Non-Tradisional. Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional, 12(2).

Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. (2025). Retrieved 11 November 2025, from https://ditjenppi.kemendag.go.id/

UN Comtrade. (2025). Retrieved 12 November 2025, from https://comtradeplus.un.org/

Ramana, F., & Retnosari, L. (2018). Analysis of Priority Countries and Products for Indonesian Export Diversification in Latin America. International Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business, 9(8).

Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. (2024, September 1). Indonesia Trade Negotiations Agenda as of 1 Sep 2024. Retrieved 1 Februari 2025, from https://ditjenppi.kemendag.go.id/publikasi/indonesia-trade-negotiations-agenda-concludedimplemented-as-of-1-sep-2024

Taufiqqurrachman, F., & Handoyo, R. (2021). Analisis Dampak IC-CEPA Terhadap Perekonomian Indonesia. Buletin Ilmiah Litbang Perdagangan, 15(1).

Al-Husin, R., & Virgianita, A. (2024). Mapping the Literature on the Relationship Between Indonesia and Chile as Non-Traditional Partners. Journal La Sociale, 5(2).

Suryanta, B., & Patunru, A. (2023). Trade Impediments in Indonesia. Journal of Economic Integration, 38(2).

Asche, H. (2021). The Reality of African Trade Integration: Challenges of Implementation. In H. Asche, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Springer.

Heryadi, R., Darmastuti, S., & Rachman, A. (2024). Advancing South-South Cooperation in Education: Indonesian Experience With South Africa. F1000 Research Ltd, 11(982).

Tobing, F., & Virgianita, A. (2020). Functional Multi-Track and Multilevel Economic Diplomacy to Strengthen Trade Relations Between Indonesia, Chile, and Peru Conditions For Success. Regions and Cohesion, 10(1).

Beyond Administrative Error: Dual Contracts as a Structural Failure in Indonesia-Turkey Labor Migration

Beyond Administrative Error: Dual Contracts as a Structural Failure in Indonesia-Turkey Labor Migration

Feb 24, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 2 | February 2026

Authors:

Putri Ayu Ningrum – Undergraduate Student in International Relations, Universitas Amikom Yogyakarta

 

Summary

This article examines the practice of dual employment contracts affecting Indonesia Migrant Worker (PMI) in Turkey, particularly in the hospitality and services sectors. It highlight a recurring pattern in which workers sign verifield employment contracts in Indonesia (Contract A), only to be required to sign revised contracts with less favorable terms upon arrival in the destination country (Contract B). The article argues that these practices should be understood as manifestations of structural weakness in labor migration governance involving placement agencies, employers, and insufficient bilateral regulatory frameworks.

Keywords: Indonesia Migrant Workers, Dual Employment Contracts, Migrant Worker Protection, Power Assymetry, Indonesia-Turkey

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Introduction

Turkey has increasingly emerged as a destination for Indonesian Migrant Workers (PMI), particularly in the hospitality and services sectors. Rising demand for foreign labor and relatively stable income prospects compared to several traditional destination countries have increased Turkey’s appeal among Indonesian job seekers. Official Turkish labour statistics indicate that approximately 8,930 Indonesian workers received new work permits in 2024, indicating that PMI presence in Turkey forms part of a growing formal labour migration corridor (Antara News, 2025).

Historically, Indonesian labor migration has concentrated on Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (KP2MI, 2022). Recent changes in international labor market structures have contributed to the emergence of non-traditional destination countries, including Turkey (Cooper, 2014).

Behind this narrative lies the practice of dual employment contracts, referring to situations in which PMI sign employment contracts in Indonesian that are verified and recorded in SISKOP2MI ( Computerized System For Servicing and Protecting Indonesian Migrant Workers), but are subsequently presented with different contracts upon arrival. These revised contracts frequently alter wages, working hours, job descriptions, and labour rights, disadvantaging workers (Cooper, 2014).

The author’s internship experience at BP3MI Yogyakarta (Indonesian Migrant Worker Protection  Center) from September to November 2025 indicates that complaints related to dual contracts are not incidental. Several PMI recruited through official placement agencies reported discrepancies between contracts uploaded to SISKOP2MI and those enforced by employers in Turkey. This aligns with national data showing that BP2MI (Indonesian Migrant Workers Protection Agency) received 2,849 formal complaints from PMI throughout 2025 (Muhammad, 2025). BP2MI reports further identify contract violations as among the most frequently reported complaints (KP2MI, 2023).

International labour organization (ILO) literature identifies unilateral contract changes after arrival as a manifestation of power asymmetry faced by migrants workers, particularly in the absence of effective cross-border monitoring mechanism (ILO, 1996). Employment contracts are intended to function as legal protection instruments ensuring transparency, legal certainly, and informed consent form the pre- departure stage (ILO, 2010). When officially verified contracts can be altered after arrival, the protection promised by formal placement systems becomes largely illusory.

Accordingly, dual employment contracts affecting PMI in Turkey should be understood not merely as administrative violations, but as indicators of structural weaknesses in migrant worker placement governance, including inadequate oversights of placement agencies, limited agreements between Indonesian and Turkey (IOM, 2022).

 

Contract Mechanisms and the PMI Placement System

Within Indonesia’s legal PMI placement system, employment contracts constitute a fundamental document defining the rights and obligations of migrant workers. Initial contracts are prepared by destination-country placement companies affiliated with P3MI (Indonesian Migrant Worker Placement Company), then verified and uploaded to SISKOP2MI (Computerized System For Servicing and Protecting Indonesian Migrant Workers), a system managed by BP2MI to ensure contractual compliance prior to departure.

Contacts recorded in SISKOP2MI are expected to reflect actual working conditions in the destination country and serve as the basis for PMI protection during overseas employment. Contractual changes after PMI arrive constitute serious violations, as they potentially contravene protection principles stipulated in Law. No.18 of 2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia, 2017).

 

Dual Contract Practices: From Contract A to Contract B

A commonly reported pattern involves PMI being recruited through official placement agencies, signing contracts recorded in SISKOP2MI (Contract A), and completing all pre-placement procedures in accordance with BP2MI regulations. Upon arrival in Turkey, some employers require PMI to sign revised contracts (Contract B), typically justified by references to local visa classifications, work permit arrangements, or firm-level compliance practices under Turkish labor regulations.

PMI who refuse these revisions perceive their rights as violated, as the contract approved prior to departure is understood to constitute the binding employment agreement. When PMI submit complaints from Turkey of return to Indonesian, BP2MI facilitates mediation between PMI and placements agencies. While agencies often argue that Contract B falls under the authority of partner companies in Turkey, placements agencies remain responsible for ensuring consistency between job orders, employment contracts, and placement agreements throughout the migration process (Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia, 2017).

 

Analytical Question: Who Bears Responsibility?

Responsibility for dual contract practices can be examined through three perspectives.

First, placement agencies are legally obligated to ensure that job orders correspond to actual working conditions in destination countries. Systematic occurrences of dual contracts indicate shortcomings in verification and oversight. Observations during the author’s internship show that agencies involved are predominantly private placements agencies operating under government authorization. During mediation, agencies frequently adopt defensive positions, attributing contractual changes to Turkish partner companies, reflecting limited leverage due to their dependence on overseas partners for job orders and work permit arrangements, as well as the absence of effective legal resource and cross-border enforcement mechanisms (Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia, 2017).

Second, partner companies in destination countries, in this case Turkey, contribute to dual contract practices by enforcing new contracts based on internal standards or local regulatory interpretations without honouring original agreements. Such practices contradict international principles of migrant worker protection emphasizing fair and transparent employment contracts    (ILO, 2025). Power asymmetries exacerbate this situation, as PMI often form lower-income backgrounds with limited access to legal assistance accept revised contracts to avoid risks such as job termination, loss of visa sponsorship, or irregular migration status.

Third, bilateral regulatory framework between Indonesia and Turkey remain insufficient. The absence of comprehensive bilateral agreements establishing minimum contract standards and monitoring mechanisms increases the risk of contracts violations and weakens migrant worker rights enforcements (IOM, 2022).

 

Impacts on PMI and the Credibility of Official Placement Systems

Dual contract practices directly affect PMI welfare and are not confined to Turkey alone. Discrepancies between initial contracts and actual working conditions frequently result in wage reductions, excessive working hours, and loss of basic labor rights, creating insecure employment environments(Safitri & Wibisono, 2023).  These findings align with ILO assessments identifying contract violations as a major factor increasing migrant worker vulnerability (ILO, 2025). Beyond individual-level impacts, dual contract practices undermine the credibility of official placement mechanism. When formal procedures fail to ensure contractual consistency and rights protection, public trust erodes, encouraging prospective workers to consider non-procedural pathways that entail significantly higher risks (IOM, 2022).

These conditions highlights structural weaknesses in labour migration governance, involving migration authorities, labour institution, and regulatory bodies with overlapping mandates (IOM UN Migration, 2024). Weak supervision, uneven standards enforcement, and limited cross-border coordination undermine worker protection. Inconsistent implementation of international standards further contributes to irregular migration, as formal procedures come to be perceived as administrative burdens rather than protection instruments (ILO, 2017).

Civil society organizations such as Migrant Care play a role in migrant worker advocacy, however, their engagement is not uniform across destination countries. In the Turkey context, no direct involvement of migrant care was observed within official placement mechanisms during the author’s internship, indicating that migrant worker protection remains primarily reliant on state institutions such as BP3MI.

 

Conclusion: The Need for Structural Reform

The Indonesian-Turkey case demonstrates that dual contract practices are not country-specific, but reflect broader structural weakness in labour migration governance that may also arise in other destination countries where recruitment is mediated by private actors and post-placement oversight remains limited. In this sense, the Turkey case illustrates governance risks shared across both traditional and emerging destinations.

Addressing these challenges requires clear state leadership in labour migration governance, with migration and labour authorities such as BP2MI, in coordination with labour ministries, playing a central role in standard setting, recruitment oversights, and cross-border monitoring. At the bilateral level, labour Memoranda of Understanding must be strengthened or transformation into enforceable arrangements, supported by joint monitoring mechanisms and accountability provisions. Without binding and enforceable MoUs, dual contract practices are likely to persist, undermining worker protection and the credibility of official placements systems.

 

References

Antara News. (2025). Indonesian worker placement in Turkey to focus on labor-intensive jobs. Antara News. https://en.antaranews.com/news/388097/indonesian-worker-placement-in-turkey-to-focus-on-labor-intensive-jobs

Cooper, R. N. (2014). Reviewed Work(s): The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration by MARTIN RUHS Review. Council on Foreign Relations, 93(1), 7–9.

ILO. (1996). Migration for Employment Convention. International Labour Organization. https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312242

ILO. (2010). International labour migration: A rights-based approach. Internasional Labour Organization.

ILO. (2017). Resolution concerning fair and effective labour migration governance (Issue June).

ILO. (2025). Protecting migrant workers from Forced Labour. In Internasional Labour Organization (Issue May).

IOM. (2022). GUIDANCE ON BILATERAL LABOUR MIGRATION AGREEMENTS. In United Nations Network on Migration (Issue February).

IOM UN Migration. (2024). WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2024.

KP2MI. (2022). Data Penempatan dan Pelindungan. Kementrian Perlindungan Pekerja Migrant Indonesia.

KP2MI. (2023). Rekapitulasi Data Pengaduan Pekerja Migran Indonesia berdasarkan Ketegori Kasus. Kementrian Perlindungan Pekerja Migrant Indonesia.

Muhammad. (2025). Ada 2.849 Aduan Pekerja Migran Indonesia pada 2025, Ini Keluhannya. Databoks. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/ketenagakerjaan/statistik/69674595779f8/ada-2849-aduan-pekerja-migran-indonesia-pada-2025-ini-keluhannya

Safitri, D., & Wibisono, A. A. (2023). Keamanan manusia pekerja migran indonesia: ketidakamanan dan perlindungannya. Journal of Internasional Studies, 7(2), 741–769. https://doi.org/10.24198/intermestic.v7n2.17

Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia (2017).

Algorithmic Blind Spots: Operational Risks of Gender Bias in Indonesia’s Defense AI

Algorithmic Blind Spots: Operational Risks of Gender Bias in Indonesia’s Defense AI

Feb 23, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 1 | February 2026

Authors:

Wendy Prajuli – Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Binus University
Cynthia Sipahutar – Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Binus University, Doctoral Student in the Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia
Curie Maharani –  Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Binus University

 

Summary

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into  military systems, reshaping defense architectures and operational practices worldwide.  The article argues that as Indonesia integrates Artificial Intelligence (AI) into its defense architecture—ranging from C4ISR systems to recruitment—it risks embedding significant gender biases. Drawing on global research from UNESCO and Berkeley Haas Center and an analysis of Indonesian policy documents (Stranas KA, Jakumhanneg), the authors contend that a “governance gap” exists. They warn that failing to address bias in datasets and algorithms could lead to operational failures (e.g., misidentifying female combatants) and normative harms (e.g., reinforcing militarized masculinity).

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, AI Defense, Indonesia, Gender, Security.

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Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly gaining traction as an integral component of contemporary human life, with applications ranging from ride-hailing and navigation services to facial recognition technologies. In the defense sector, AI has evolved from conceptual speculation to an operational reality, as evidenced by the progression of defense systems from C2 to C4ISR, C5ISR, and C6ISR architectures. The deployment of precision-guided munitions exemplifies the prominent use of AI-enabled capabilities.

The rapid expansion of AI in military applications has prompted many states, including Indonesia, to pursue the development and acquisition of AI-based defense systems. In Indonesia, research and development in this field have begun, but progress remains constrained by budgetary limitations and competing priorities. Despite the growing ubiquity of AI across multiple sectors, there is limited recognition that AI technologies are not inherently gender-neutral.

A growing body of scholarship demonstrates that AI systems can replicate and amplify gender biases because they are created, trained, and deployed by humans whose perspectives are shaped by prevailing cultural norms. How cultural norms amplify gender bias and gap in AI can be seen in research by Tunjungbiru, el.al. Their research shows that 74.24% of Indonesian women lack AI literacy, with 12.12% at the basic level and 13.64% at the advanced level, while among men, 60% lack AI literacy, 21.54% have basic AI literacy, and 18.46% have advanced AI literacy. Recognizing and addressing these biases is essential if Indonesia is to develop and adopt AI-based defense systems that are both operationally effective and socially equitable.

 

AI and Gender Bias: Evidence from Global Research

Evidence from global research underscores the persistence of gender bias in AI. A UNESCO study analyzing three AI-based applications, GPT, ChatGPT, and LLaMA, found that these systems tended to associate women with the domestic sphere, including home, family, children, and marriage, while linking men to business, executive leadership, careers, and salaries. The same study also revealed a negative bias toward homosexuality. Comparable findings emerged from research conducted by the Berkeley Haas Center for Equity, Gender & Leadership, which examined 133 AI systems across industries and found that 44 percent exhibited gender bias. In contrast, 25 percent demonstrated both gender and racial prejudice. According to UNESCO, gender bias in AI stems from three primary sources: bias in datasets, bias in algorithm selection, and bias in implementation. Dataset bias arises when training data lack variation and adequate representation. Algorithmic bias occurs when modeling processes fail to account for diversity. Implementation bias arises when AI systems are applied beyond their original context or adjusted in response to user feedback without accounting for demographic diversity.

The underrepresentation of women in AI development compounds these problems. Research by Interface indicates that women constitute only 22 percent of the global AI workforce, with even lower representation at senior levels. This lack of diversity not only limits perspectives in the design and deployment of AI systems but also perpetuates the risk of embedding existing social inequalities into technological systems.

 

Potential Gender Bias in Defense AI

In defense applications, gender bias can originate from both technological and normative sources. Technological and data-related biases arise when skewed datasets are used in AI training, resulting in algorithms that systematically disadvantage certain genders. Since humans are responsible for selecting and labeling training data, any pre-existing gender biases they hold can be reproduced in AI outputs. This can have significant implications, such as in AI-assisted military recruitment, where biased algorithms could reject non-male candidates by deeming them unfit based on gendered standards for height or physical composition. Such practices can significantly restrict women’s access to military careers. These risks are not hypothetical; the United Kingdom has already begun integrating AI into its military recruitment processes.

Operationally, biased algorithms may also jeopardize mission success. In reconnaissance-strike operations, for example, if AI systems are trained solely on male combatant profiles, they may fail to recognize female combatants deployed by an adversary. This could result in misclassification of threats, targeting errors, or mission failure.

Furthermore, military AI applications linked algorithmic (gender) bias to civilian suffering in war settings can escalate into acts of gender-based violence in conflict zones. Many AI-based target profiles portray men as violent, dangerous, and predatory, which contributed to this outcome. The AI military application design was based on the concept of militarized masculinity. The influence of such bias features in military AI creates status for cisgender men as undeserving of civilian status. In a larger sense, this assumption increases the danger of civilian injury from gender-based violence in conflict zones.

Hyper militarized masculinity culture in defense technology including in AI military application challenges the inclusivity and intersectionality of the AI technology development. Whereas ethical issues are essential in building a human centered and responsible AI weapons, male dominated engineers and military officers remain leading the armaments design and production process for the advantages of efficiency, speed and scale. Without inclusivity in AI military production and development, elite power also dominates the business and raises more discrimination, marginalization and exclusivity which can safeguard the bias and unethical uses of AI in military applications.

On the normative front, there is a notable absence of national or international regulations explicitly addressing gender bias in defense AI. While some states have endorsed initiatives such as the REAIM blueprint for responsible AI use in the military, these frameworks generally omit provisions to mitigate gender bias, particularly in the development and implementation of AI defense systems. For example, this initiative of the blueprint for responsible use of AI only generally acknowledges that all AI applications in the military “must be developed, deployed, and used in accordance with international law, including, as applicable, the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, international human rights law; and, as appropriate, other relevant legal frameworks, including regional instruments.” There is no specific mention of addressing gender bias in defense AI.

In some cases, states prefer the term “social bias” over “gender bias” in official documents, potentially obscuring the issue and reflecting the incomplete integration of gender norms into international governance of defense AI.

 

Indonesia’s Emerging Defense AI Capabilities and the Gender Bias Gap

Indonesia’s development of defense AI remains in its early stages but shows considerable potential. At present, its use is primarily confined to virtual reality and augmented reality applications in military training. The Indonesian Air Force (TNI AU) has announced plans to introduce AI-based airspace security systems by 2025, and AI has already been incorporated into exercises such as the 2024 Angkasa Yudha operation, which utilized AI in air communications. The Air Command and Staff College (Seskoau) has also sent officer cadets to China to study AI-based defense technologies.

The Indonesian Army (TNI AD) collaborated with a private defense company to develop an AI-enabled unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Meanwhile, the Navy (TNI AL) created an AI-powered data analytics tool called System Performance Readiness and Tactical Analysis (Spartan). Spartan helps detect unusual vessel traffic and activities, automates vessel tracking, and suggests possible actions based on real-time data from naval warships at sea.

At the strategic level, the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces has expressed intentions to adapt military doctrine to accommodate AI integration. AI is also being used for public relations and information dissemination, and plans are underway to implement AI in defense-related functions in the new capital city, Nusantara.

Despite these advancements, gender bias has yet to become a formal consideration in Indonesia’s defense AI development. Even the Stranas KA 2020-2024  (National Strategy of Indonesian Artificial Intelligence), a blueprint for Indonesia’s AI development, also does not address the importance of gender in AI development. The same applies to the two Indonesian defense documents, Jakumhanneg 2020-2024 (General National Defense Policy 2020-2024) and Jakgarahanneg 2020-2024 (National Defense Implementation Policy 2020-2024). Those documents also do not mention gender in AI defense development.

Where gender elements are present, they tend to be incidental, as in the case of Navy Second Lieutenant (E/W) Fitria Dwi Ratnasari’s involvement in the creation of Antasena, a maritime surveillance system. Without deliberate measures to address bias, Indonesia risks embedding gender inequalities into its defense AI systems, with potentially adverse consequences for both operational effectiveness and social inclusion.

Addressing this challenge requires sustained awareness that AI is neither value-free nor gender-neutral. It also demands integrating feminist perspectives into defense AI development, increasing gender diversity among the researchers and engineers responsible for such systems, and collecting more representative datasets that explicitly incorporate gender variables.

Moreover, the formulation of both national and international regulatory frameworks that explicitly prohibit gender bias in defense AI will be crucial to ensuring that Indonesia’s defense innovation trajectory aligns with the principles of equality, accountability, and responsible technological governance. Additionally, Indonesia’s early-stage AI-based defense development presents opportunities to design gender-sensitive systems from the outset, thereby establishing a strong foundation for future growth.

 

Reference

Antara News, TNI AU kembangkan teknologi pertahanan berbasis AI pada 2025. 2024, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4524067/tni-au-kembangkan-teknologi-pertahanan-berbasis-ai-pada-2025

Antara News, Ratusan pasis Seskoau kunjungi China pelajari AI di bidang pertahanan. 2024, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/4260415/ratusan-pasis-seskoau-kunjungi-china-pelajari-ai-di-bidang-pertahanan

Borchert, Heiko., Schutz, Torben., dan Verboszky, Joseph. (2024) The Very Long Game: 25 Case Studies on the Global State of Defense AI, Springer.

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Commodifying Queerness: Industri Drama Boys’ Love sebagai Soft Power Thailand

Jan 31, 2026 | HI Quarterly

Shifwa Naila Samodra

HI UI 2024

 

Industri drama Boys’ Love (BL) menjadi salah satu industri yang dominan di Thailand. Bahkan, BL Thailand dapat disebut sebagai revolusi dari industri BL itu sendiri. Sebelumnya, negara-negara lain seperti Tiongkok, Korea, dan Jepang masih mengalami hambatan finansial dalam produksi drama BL dan arah yang cukup konservatif. Thailand mengukuhkan produksi drama BL menjadi suatu industri dengan sistem tertentu dan dukungan finansial yang memadai. Drama BL Thailand kemudian dikonsumsi dan dikenal secara luas, terutama di Asia Tenggara. Industri drama BL dapat dipahami sebagai cerminan dari soft power Thailand sebagai penggerak utama industri ini. Soft power ini tidak hanya memengaruhi ekonomi Thailand semata, tetapi juga membuka dan membentuk diskusi hangat terkait isu queer dan representasinya di media.

Drama BL Thailand menjadi suatu industri tersendiri dengan sistem tertentu. Perusahaan-perusahaan besar seperti GMMTV, Be On Cloud, dan Domundi memproduksi berbagai drama BL yang populer secara internasional seperti 2gether the Series (2020) dengan rating 7.6/10 (IMDb), SOTUS the Series (2016) dengan rating 7.8/10 (IMDb), dan Bad Buddy (2022) dengan rating 8.7/10 (IMDb). Drama BL ini dapat diakses melalui platform streaming gratis seperti YouTube. Audiens yang luas disebabkan oleh kemudahan akses terhadap konten drama BL ini sehingga dapat dinikmati oleh berbagai orang. Audiens BL Thailand internasional terbanyak berasal dari negara Asia Tenggara seperti Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapura, Vietnam, dan Filipina. Selain itu, BL Thailand juga dinikmati oleh audiens dari Brazil, Portugal, Amerika Serikat, Peru, dan Meksiko. Meskipun drama BL tersedia secara gratis, industri ini tetap dapat meraup keuntungan besar melalui merchandise, fanmeeting, konser, dan screening. BL Thailand berhasil membentuk komunitas penggemar internasional yang aktif, terutama secara daring melalui media sosial seperti Twitter, termasuk komunitas penggemar dari Indonesia.

Soft power merupakan kemampuan suatu aktor, terutama negara, untuk memengaruhi pihak lain bukan melalui paksaan, tetapi melalui daya tarik. Hal tersebut berbeda dengan hard power yang meliputi kekuatan militer dan ancaman. Soft power membentuk preferensi aktor lain melalui daya tarik (Nye dalam Art dan Jervis, 2017). Dalam konteks BL Thailand, BL dapat dilihat sebagai cultural soft power. BL Thailand merupakan produk budaya populer yang dikonsumsi lintas negara dan disebar melalui platform digital seperti YouTube, Netflix, dan media sosial lainnya. Daya tarik BL Thailand membentuk fanbase atau komunitas penggemar internasional. Hal tersebut dapat dilihat dari adanya fanmeeting yang diadakan di berbagai negara. Meskipun pemerintah Thailand tidak selalu secara eksplisit mengklaim BL sebagai diplomasi budaya, mereka menciptakan lingkungan yang mendukung pertumbuhan industri tersebut. Industri drama BL ini membentuk framing Thailand sebagai ruang aman bagi kelompok queer di Asia. Thailand mampu memengaruhi persepsi audiens global tanpa menggunakan instrumen koersif, sekaligus memperkuat citranya di ranah internasional. Melalui BL Thailand, penggemar merasa tertarik pada Thailand secara lebih luas dan dapat tertarik untuk mempelajari bahasa Thai, berwisata ke Thailand, atau mengonsumsi produk Thailand.

Akan tetapi, muncul permasalahan terkait representasi queer dalam drama BL Thailand. Meskipun ada beberapa aktor BL yang mengidentifikasikan dirinya sebagai queer, sebagian besar aktor BL bukan merupakan dari kelompok queer. Perusahaan produksi drama BL membayar aktor non-queer untuk melakukan fanservice baik di dalam drama maupun di luar itu (seperti dalam fanmeeting, konser, atau acara sejenisnya). Hal tersebut mencerminkan identitas queer yang menjadi nilai jual dan bukan menjadi subjek emansipasi ataupun representasi. Tujuan utama dari industri BL ini adalah untuk mencari keuntungan, bukan untuk memberikan ruang emansipasi dan representasi bagi identitas queer. Selain itu, BL Thailand cenderung merepresentasikan hubungan queer yang heteronormatif dengan adanya pembagian peran maskulin/feminin yang kaku. Hal tersebut sejalan dengan pembingkaian hubungan queer yang tidak cukup representatif dan mengukuhkan nilai-nilai heteronormatif. Terlebih lagi, perempuan dalam drama BL sering digambarkan secara negatif sehingga mengukuhkan nilai-nilai misoginis (Garg dan Yang, 2024). Meskipun Thailand dapat menikmati keuntungan dari industri drama BL sebagai soft power, komodifikasi queer melalui industri ini perlu diatasi sehingga kelompok queer dapat direpresentasikan secara akurat dan emansipatif alih-alih menjadi aset dan nilai jual saja. 

Meskipun industri drama BL sebagai soft power Thailand menuai beberapa kritik terkait komodifikasi dan representasi, tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa drama BL Thailand juga mendorong audiensnya untuk mengenal dan menerima identitas queer walaupun dalam ranah yang terbatas. Indonesia, contohnya, sebagai salah satu negara dengan homonegativitas tertinggi di Asia Tenggara (Manalastas dkk., 2017), menjadi salah satu audiens terbesar dari drama BL Thailand. Hal tersebut menunjukkan adanya perubahan persepsi terhadap identitas queer, meskipun masih sangat terbatas dan tidak sepenuhnya inklusif. Akan tetapi, media dan budaya populer seperti drama BL Thailand dapat menjadi titik pertama dari penerimaan identitas queer. Meskipun begitu, pemikiran kritis dibutuhkan untuk menilai jika penerimaan tersebut hanya sebatas “fetish” dan bukan penerimaan komunitas queer sebagai manusia.

Industri drama BL Thailand menunjukkan bahwa budaya populer dapat berfungsi sebagai sumber soft power yang efektif dalam membentuk citra negara di tingkat internasional. Melalui daya tarik budaya, BL Thailand berhasil memperkuat citra Thailand sebagai negara yang terbuka dengan identitas queer sekaligus memperluas pengaruh kulturalnya di kawasan Asia Tenggara dan global. Namun, keberhasilan tersebut menyingkap persoalan representasi queer dalam BL yang lebih banyak didorong oleh logika pasar dibandingkan diberlakukan sebagai sarana emansipasi dan representasi yang inklusif. Komodifikasi identitas queer dalam industri BL memperlihatkan bahwa budaya yang ditampilkan tidak selalu sejalan dengan intensinya untuk memberikan wadah representasi yang akurat, melainkan digunakan untuk memaksimalkan keuntungan. Meskipun demikian, drama BL Thailand tetap memiliki signifikasi sebagai titik awal perubahan persepsi, terutama di negara-negara dengan tingkat homonegativitas tinggi seperti Indonesia.

 

 

 

Referensi

Art, Robert J. dan Robert Jervis. (2017). International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. Pearson.

 

Garg, Divya dan Xiaofei Yang. (2024, 30 Januari). “Beyond a Queer Utopia: Interrogating Misogyny in Transnational Boys Love Media” dalam Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies. Routledge. 770–782. https://doi.org/10.1080/10304312.2024.2314186. 

 

Jiang, Long dan Yuxin Wei. (2024, 6 Juni). “Boys Love Media in Thailand: Celebrity, Fans, and Transnational Asian Queer Popular Culture” dalam Critical Arts. Routledge. 261–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/02560046.2024.2361352. 

 

Lyajoon, Stephen. (2024, 6 Agustus). “BL Drama: The Thai Entertainment Industry as a Source of Soft Power” dalam English Language, Literature & Culture. Science Publishing Group. 72–76. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ellc.20240903.13. 

 

Manalastas, Eric Julian, dkk. (2017). “Homonegativity in Southeast Asia: Attitudes Toward Lesbians and Gay Men in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam” dalam Asia-Pacific Social Science Review. 25–33. https://doi.org/10.59588/2350-8329.1120. 

 

Michaels, Ekathep, dkk. (2024, 29 Juli). “Mainstreaming Queerness in Thai Boys’ Love Narratives: Impact on Gay Identity Perceptions in Bangkok’s Society” dalam Sexualities. Sage. https://doi.org/10.1177/13634607241263194. 

 

Setiawan, R., dkk. (2025, 13 Oktober). “Thai Boys’ Love: Queer Representation and Cultural Diplomacy in Thailand’s Soft Power Strategy in Southeast Asia” dalam Bhuvana: Journal of Global Studies. Vol. 3 No. 2. Universitas Satya Negara Indonesia. 166–193. https://doi.org/10.59408/bjgs.v3i2.238. 



Memahami Relasi China-Kamboja dalam Konteks Positive Sum Game dan Power

Jan 17, 2026 | HI Quarterly

Jeromi Mikhael
HI UI 2023

 

China dan Kamboja merupakan dua negara yang telah menjalin hubungan bilateral sejak lama. Hubungan antara kedua negara semakin erat setelah restorasi kerajaan Kambodia pada tahun 1993. China memberikan dukungan kepada Kamboja melalui investasi, perdagangan, dan bantuan tanpa syarat. Seiring dengan berjalannya waktu, muncul pertanyaan mengenai untung-rugi dari dukungan finansial China terhadap Kamboja. Para pendukung menganggap China membawa kemajuan dan pembangunan melalui bantuannya, sedangkan para penentang menganggap bahwa bantuan yang diberikan mendorong korupsi dan kerusakan lingkungan di Kamboja. Salah satu tokoh yang mengkaji mengenai permasalahan ini adalah Pheakday Heng, seorang dosen dan peneliti di Royal University of Phnom Penh.

Review ini akan mengulas mengenai artikel berjudul “Cambodia-China Relations: A Positive Sum Game?” yang ditulis oleh Pheakday Heng untuk mengkaji apakah dukungan yang diberikan oleh China kepada Kamboja merupakan sebuah positive sum game. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menganalisa positive sum game maupun konsep power dalam realisme dengan menggunakan hubungan China-Kamboja sebagai bahan dasar. Tulisan ini dibagi menjadi empat bagian, yakni rangkuman bahan utama, perbandingan, analisis, serta kesimpulan.

 

Rangkuman Bahan Utama

Hubungan antara China dan Kamboja telah berlangsung sejak abad ke-13 dan terus berlanjut hingga masa sekarang. Hubungan kedua negara menjadi semakin dekat, bahkan China mulai mendominasi Kamboja dalam berbagai aspek. Dominasi China dapat diamati dalam berbagai bentuk, seperti investasi asing, kegiatan perdagangan bilateral, dan dukungan militer.

Investasi asing langsung mulai diterima oleh Kamboja setelah pemilihan umum tahun 1993 yang memulihkan situasi keamanan dan ketertiban. Sumber daya alam potensial, biaya tenaga kerja yang rendah, dan insentif mendorong China beserta dengan negara-negara lainnya mulai berinvestasi dalam jumlah besar di Kamboja. Jumlah proyek investasi China meningkat dari tahun ke tahun, dan pada tahun 2011 China telah menjadi investor dominan di Kamboja. Investasi dari China juga semakin bervariasi seiring dengan berjalannya waktu, mulai dari sektor sandang dan manufaktur skala kecil hingga ke sektor energi dan sumber daya alam.

Selain menjadi investor terbesar di Kamboja, China merupakan rekan dagang terpenting bagi Kamboja. Kegiatan perdagangan antara kedua negara mengalami peningkatan signifikan antara tahun 2000 dan 2010. Tren ini terus berlanjut setelah penerapan perjanjian perdagangan bebas antara China dan ASEAN pada bulan Januari 2010. Kedua negara ini juga telah bekerjasama dalam sektor militer melalui latihan militer yang diberikan China kepada personil militer Kamboja sejak tahun 1999 untuk mengembangkan militernya.

China merupakan negara pemberi bantuan terbesar bagi Kamboja. Bantuan yang diberikan oleh China tidak dibarengi dengan persyaratan apapun dan cenderung tidak transparan dalam pengelolaannya. Menurut Heng, kurangnya transparansi ini disebabkan oleh keberatan untuk mempertanggungjawabkan bantuannya, keengganan untuk memberikan informasi kepada negara penerima, serta kesulitan dalam memperoleh data bantuan.

Investasi dan bantuan yang diberikan oleh China kepada Kamboja menimbulkan pertanyaan karena sifatnya yang tanpa syarat. Tujuan terselubung di balik investasi dan bantuan ini dapat dikaji dengan mengamati konsentrasi investasi dan situasi dalam negeri China. Investasi dari negara China umumnya dilakukan oleh BUMN, sehingga investasi lebih berfokus untuk mencapai tujuan politis alih-alih mencari keuntungan.

Tinjauan lebih lanjut terhadap situasi dalam negeri China oleh Heng menemukan sejumlah pola umum dari investasi yang dilakukan China, yakni konsentrasi pada sektor energi dan pertanian akibat kelangkaan dalam negeri dan ekspansi pasar ekspor untuk menyokong pabrik manufaktur domestik. China juga berupaya untuk memanfaatkan kekuatan militer, kapasitas produksi, serta beasiswa dan lembaga kebudayaan untuk memperluas pengaruh internasional dari investasi yang dilakukan. 

Dalam kasus hubungan bilateral antara China dan Kamboja, dominasi China di negara tersebut berdampak terhadap dukungan Kamboja yang sangat kuat terhadap semua kebijakan luar negeri China. Kamboja menolak tegas keberadaan Taiwan sebagai negara merdeka dan mendeportasi warga Uighur yang kabur ke Kamboja kembali ke China. China juga berhasil memanfaatkan kedudukan Kamboja di organisasi ASEAN untuk mencegah pembahasan mengenai Laut China Selatan dalam KTT ASEAN yang diselenggarakan oleh Kamboja. Dalam sektor perdagangan, China berhasil memperoleh status dagang yang menguntungkan, sehingga dapat menghindari kuota dan tarif dagang yang telah ditetapkan oleh AS dan Uni Eropa. Potensi sumber daya alam dan lingkungan tanah yang subur juga menguntungkan China dalam berinvestasi di negara Kamboja.

Dominasi China juga dapat diamati dari perspektif kemiliteran. Posisi geografis Kamboja yang unik dimanfaatkan oleh China untuk mendapatkan akses ke pangkalan udara dan laut di negara tersebut. Akses ini memungkinkan China untuk mengisi ulang kapal maupun pesawatnya. Kehadiran militer China di Kamboja memungkinkan China untuk memproyeksikan kekuatannya di Asia Tenggara serta menyeimbangkan pengaruh Amerika Serikat di wilayah tersebut. Di sisi lain, eksistensi budaya China di Kamboja dalam bentuk pendidikan, kuliner, tradisi, serta festival, menonjolkan peranan China di dalam masyarakat Kamboja. 

Keberadaan China dalam berbagai aspek menimbulkan kontroversi. Sejumlah lembaga seperti Cambodia Development Resource Institute dan United Nations Development Programme, berargumen bahwa investasi dan dukungan finansial yang diberikan oleh China mendorong pembangunan, elektrifikasi, serta pengentasan kemiskinan di Kamboja. Meski dampaknya tidak dapat dirasakan langsung, bantuan yang diberikan akan berpengaruh terhadap kesejahteraan masyarakat dalam jangka panjang.

Di sisi lain, LSM seperti Radio Free Asia dan Global Witness menganggap bahwa bantuan dan investasi dari China berdampak pada penurunan kualitas pemerintahan dan peningkatan korupsi. Kurangnya transparansi dalam bantuan yang diberikan oleh China membuat bantuan tersebut menjadi rawan untuk disalahgunakan. Pelanggaran hak asasi manusia seringkali terjadi di pabrik-pabrik China dan eksploitasi sumber daya alam yang dilakukan oleh China telah mengakibatkan kerusakan skala besar terhadap lingkungan hidup Kamboja.

Dominasi bantuan dan investasi yang diberikan oleh China dapat berdampak terhadap independensi pemerintah Kamboja dalam pengambilan keputusan. Keberpihakan Kamboja terhadap China dapat diamati dalam kebijakan dalam negeri maupun luar negeri yang diambil. Negara-negara ASEAN mengkritik kepemimpinan Kamboja dalam sidang-sidang ASEAN karena terlalu condong terhadap kepentingan China dan cenderung mengabaikan kepentingan kolektif ASEAN. Hal ini dikhawatirkan dapat merugikan ASEAN maupun Kamboja sendiri.

Untung dan rugi yang timbul dari keterlibatan China dalam berbagai aspek di Kamboja menimbulkan pertanyaan mengenai keuntungan bersih yang diperoleh Kamboja (positive sum game). Kajian mengenai keuntungan bersih ini dihalangi oleh kurangnya informasi terkait dengan kegiatan ekonomi China di Kamboja dan bukti-bukti empiris dari keberadaan China. Meski demikian, satu hal yang pasti di masa depan adalah peran penting China di Kamboja dan dominasi China di Kamboja akan terus bertahan di masa depan. China membutuhkan Kamboja untuk memperluas pengaruhnya di ASEAN dan mengimbangi kekuatan AS, dan Kamboja membutuhkan China untuk meningkatkan pertumbuhan ekonominya. Di akhir bacaan, Heng memberikan pengingat bahwa kegagalan dalam mengelola bantuan dan investasi dapat berakibat pada kerugian yang lebih besar dari keuntungan yang diperoleh. Heng merekomendasikan kedua belah pihak untuk meningkatkan transparansi, memperbaiki kepemimpinan, mengurangi dampak buruk terhadap lingkungan, dan memeratakan keuntungan yang diperoleh kepada seluruh lapisan masyarakat agar menciptakan kerjasama yang menghasilkan positive-sum game.

 

Perbandingan

Persoalan mengenai positive sum game dalam hubungan antara China dan Kamboja dapat dibandingkan dengan konsep positive sum game di Eurozone (negara-negara yang mengadopsi mata uang Euro). Menurut artikel yang ditulis oleh Paolo Guerrieri, penerapan mata uang tunggal Euro dan respon yang beragam dari setiap negara terhadap globalisasi telah menciptakan defisit dan surplus dalam akun berjalan negara-negara pengadopsi mata uang Eropa dan menimbulkan krisis hutang serta pertumbuhan ekonomi yang rendah. Krisis ekonomi yang melanda dunia pada tahun 2008 telah mengekspos sistem Eurozone sebagai sebuah zero-sum game yang hanya menguntungkan segelintir negara di Eurozone dan merugikan negara lainnya.

Guerrieri menganggap bahwa Eurozone perlu menerapkan sebuah sistem yang menguntungkan semua, atau positive-sum game, dengan menciptakan sebuah rezim ekonomi Eropa yang mampu memantau dan mengoreksi ketidakseimbangan makroekonomi dan mendorong koordinasi antarnegara. Selain itu, positive-sum game juga dapat dicapai dengan penyesuaian dari negara kreditur maupun debitur. Agar mencapai suatu keuntungan bersama, negara kreditor harus meningkatkan belanja maupun impornya, sedangkan negara debitur harus meningkatkan daya saing dan tabungannya.

Model positive sum game yang disarankan oleh Guerrieri untuk memperbaiki Eurozone memiliki sejumlah kesamaan maupun perbedaan dengan saran dari Heng. Kedua gagasan ini menekankan perlunya pemerataan ekonomi sebagai syarat mutlak dari terciptanya sebuah kerjasama yang bersifat saling menguntungkan. Dengan adanya pemerataan ekonomi, negara yang terlibat dalam kerjasama internasional mampu memanfaatkan investasi maupun bantuan yang diberikan dari negara lain dengan baik. Selain itu, perbaikan sistem pemerintahan maupun transparansi dari dalam negara-negara yang terlibat juga penting untuk menjamin bahwa produk ekonomi yang diterima tepat guna dan tepat sasaran.

 

Analisis

Model positive sum game yang diajukan oleh Heng merupakan salah satu dari jenis interaksi dalam game theory. Game theory merupakan sebuah model analisis yang memprediksi interaksi para pengambil keputusan dalam mengambil keputusan dengan mempertimbangkan reaksi dan pilihan dari pengambil keputusan lainnya. Game theory membedakan tiga jenis interaksi antara para pengambil keputusan: positive-sum game, negative-sum game, dan zero-sum game. Positive-sum game adalah situasi di mana total keuntungan dan kerugian dari semua pihak yang terlibat berjumlah positif. Jenis interaksi ini merupakan yang terbaik diantara yang lainnya karena keuntungan yang bisa didapatkan oleh kedua belah pihak. 

Dalam konteks hubungan China-Kamboja, positive sum game dapat dimaknai sebagai situasi ketika China memperoleh imbal balik dari bantuannya dan Kamboja juga memperoleh keuntungan dari bantuan yang diberikan. Seperti yang telah dijelaskan, imbal balik dari bantuan China tersebut dapat dengan jelas diamati dalam produksi energi dan pangan, peningkatan pengaruh militer China di wilayah ASEAN, serta kemampuan China dalam memblokir pembahasan isu-isu sensitif yang membahayakannya. Di sisi lain, keuntungan dari bantuan China terhadap Kamboja masih dipertanyakan. Kerugian seperti kehilangan independensi dalam pembuatan keputusan, meningkatnya korupsi dan melemahnya kinerja pemerintah akibat korupsi bantuan dari China merupakan sejumlah hal yang mendorong pertanyaan mengenai dampak positif bantuan China.

Dominasi pengaruh China dalam berbagai sektor di Kamboja dapat diamati dalam kacamata realis. Konsep utama dari realisme, power, menjadi faktor pendorong utama dari dominasi tersebut. Menurut Hans Morgenthau dalam bukunya Politics Among Nations (1948), power yang dimiliki oleh suatu negara berasal dari sembilan elemen utama. Elemen-elemen ini dapat dibagi menjadi elemen alamiah dan elemen sosial. Elemen alamiah terdiri dari geografi, sumber daya alam, dan populasi, sedangkan elemen sosial terdiri dari kapasitas industri, kesiapan militer, karakter bangsa, moral bangsa, kualitas diplomasi, dan kualitas pemerintahan.

Sebagai sebuah negara yang kaya akan sumber daya alam, power Kamboja secara umum berasal dari elemen alamiahnya. Hal ini dibuktikan dengan penjelasan Heng mengenai persebaran sumber daya mineral dan energi yang dimiliki oleh Kamboja serta letak geografisnya. Di sisi lain, power China sebagian besar berasal dari elemen sosialnya. Meski China memiliki populasi dalam jumlah besar dan letak yang strategis, sebagian besar sumber daya alam yang dimilikinya telah dihabiskan untuk menenagai industri yang dimiliki. 

Kelebihan power yang dimiliki oleh China tersebut digunakan untuk mendominasi negara yang jauh lebih lemah seperti Kamboja. Kamboja yang hanya memiliki sepersekian power China harus menerima penetrasi China dalam berbagai aspek, mulai dari kebijakan perekonomian hingga kebijakan luar negeri negara tersebut. Contoh konkret dari kasus ini didemonstrasikan oleh Heng dalam kunjungan Presiden China Hu Jintao ke Kamboja pada tahun 2012, beberapa saat sebelum KTT ASEAN diselenggarakan di Kamboja. Hu Jintao menjanjikan bantuan berjumlah jutaan dolar dengan permintaan bahwa persengketaan Laut China Selatan tidak akan didiskusikan dalam KTT ASEAN. Meski secara resmi merupakan bantuan, tindakan China ini dapat dianggap sebagai implementasi hard power dalam bentuk suap agar mendorong negara lain melakukan keinginannya dan mengabaikan kepentingan yang lebih luas.

 

Kesimpulan

Dari bacaan ini, dapat disimpulkan bahwa dukungan yang diberikan China kepada Kamboja terdiri dari berbagai jenis, yakni investasi, perjanjian dagang, bantuan militer, serta bantuan finansial tanpa syarat. Bantuan-bantuan ini dipandang sebagai upaya China dalam mengimplementasikan power yang dimilikinya untuk mencapai tujuan dalam negerinya. Meski demikian, aspek positive sum game dari bantuan yang diberikan masih dipertanyakan karena kontroversi terkait dampaknya bagi Kamboja. Meski terdapat sejumlah dampak positif seperti pembangunan dan perbaikan taraf hidup, tidak dapat dipungkiri bahwa dampak lainnya seperti kerusakan lingkungan, peningkatan korupsi, dan kehilangan independensi dalam pembuatan keputusan merupakan efek samping yang signifikan dari bantuan tersebut. Oleh sebab itu, kedua negara perlu melakukan perbaikan dalam sistem bantuan dan investasi agar positive sum game bisa terwujud.

 

 

 

Daftar Pustaka

Britannica. “Positive-Sum Game.” https://www.britannica.com/topic/positive-sum-game.

Guerrieri, P., dan P. Esposito. “Intra-European Imbalances, Adjustment, and Growth in the Eurozone.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28, no. 3 (1 September 2012): 532–550. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grs026.

Jablonsky, David. “National Power.” VOLUME I: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2008. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12115.13.

Pheakdey, Heng. “Cambodia-China Relations: A Positive-Sum Game?” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 2 (Juni 2012): 57–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341203100203.

Sempa, Francis P. “Hans Morgenthau and the Balance of Power in Asia.” The Diplomat, 25 May 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/hans-morgenthau-and-the-balance-of-power-in-asia/.



Australia-Indonesia’s New Security Treaty: A Blast from the Past

Australia-Indonesia’s New Security Treaty: A Blast from the Past

Des 31, 2025 | Commentaries, Publication

Vol. VI / No. 8 | December 2025

Authors:
Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto
Lecturer, Department of International Relations, FISIP, Universitas Indonesia.
His doctoral thesis analyses Australia-Indonesia relations during the Cold War

Summary

The 2025 Australia-Indonesia Treaty on Common Security (TCS) represents a “blast from the past”—a significant yet retrospective development in bilateral relations. Much like the 1995 Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS), the TCS prioritizes mutual consultation regarding ambiguous “adverse challenges” rather than committing to specific common actions. While the treaty allows leaders to jointly meet external security challenges, it remains distinct from the 2024 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA), which focuses on practical interoperability. However, the TCS relies heavily on the personal rapport between Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto, mirroring the Keating-Suharto relationship that underpinned the short-lived AMS. Given elite trust is often transient, the TCS cannot rely solely on top-down political signals. Instead, successful security cooperation requires “ground-up” institutionalization to address concrete external threats and ensure the relationship survives beyond current political tenures.

Keywords: Australia-Indonesia Relations, Treaty on Common Security (TCS), Security Cooperation, Strategic-Trust, Institutionalization

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