From Penetrated System to Strategic Uncertainty: The Iran War and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Security Order

From Penetrated System to Strategic Uncertainty: The Iran War and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Security Order

Apr 1, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 7 | April 2026

Authors:

Broto Wardoyo – Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia; Principal Nenggala Research

 

Summary

For decades, the Middle East operated as a “penetrated regional system,” with the United States serving as the ultimate stabilizer. However, the ongoing war signals a fundamental transformation. The US is no longer a reliable guarantor but increasingly a source of volatility, driven by retrenchment and shifting global priorities that treat the Middle East as secondary. This commentary identifies three sequential shifts; first, external powers, particularly the US, have shifted from stabilizers to catalysts of escalation through unpredictable, reactive interventions rather than sustained crisis management. Second, Gulf states’ security guarantees are eroding as their long-standing American patron becomes unreliable, forcing strategic reassessment. Third, Iran’s attacks on infrastructure reveal that Gulf security requires protection beyond the military sphere. Consequently, regional actors are diversifying security partnerships beyond the US and emphasizing regional diplomacy, gradually establishing greater autonomy despite inherent instability.

Keywords: Middle East, Iran, Gulf States, the United States, Security Arrangement, Asymmetric Strategy

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Introduction

For decades, the Middle East has been understood through the lens of a penetrated regional system (Brown, 1984). In such a system, regional conflicts rarely remain local but are deeply entangled with external powers, whose involvement is either invited by local actors or imposed through broader geopolitical competition. This pattern has long defined the region’s security architecture: local rivalries escalate into proxy conflicts, while stability, however fragile, is ultimately underwritten by external guarantors, particularly the United States in the post-Cold War era.

The ongoing war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran signals a fundamental disruption of this logic. Rather than reinforcing external stabilization, the conflict reveals a transformation in how security is produced, contested, and perceived. Three interrelated shifts are particularly significant: the changing role of external powers as sources of instability, the erosion of credible security guarantees, and the strategic recalibration of regional actors.

 

The Changing Role of External Powers: From Stabilizer to Catalyst of Escalation

First, the war shows that external powers are no longer merely stabilizers or neutral arbiters but can act as direct catalysts of escalation. The US’s involvement, particularly through strikes on Iranian targets, illustrates a departure from its earlier posture of managed engagement.

During earlier periods, Washington sought to contain conflicts, balancing deterrence with restraint to avoid escalation. This approach was evident in its long-standing containment strategy and, more recently, in the Obama administration’s reliance on diplomacy and calibrated pressure to avert both war and nuclear proliferation (Takeyh, 2006; Parsi, 2017; Nazareth, 2019). Even in moments of acute tension, the US policy prioritized de-escalation and direct engagement, reflecting a commitment to managing rather than intensifying conflict. However, policy shifts under the Trump administration marked a clear departure. By abandoning the JCPOA and adopting a “maximum pressure” strategy, Washington moved beyond containment toward rolling back Iranian influence, embedding coercion at the center of its policy and increasing the risk of broader instability (Simon, 2018; Nazareth, 2019).

This shift is primarily driven by changes in the US global priorities, even as domestic pressures remain relevant. Scholarship on retrenchment suggests that great powers facing relative decline recalibrate grand strategy by reducing commitments in peripheral regions and reallocating resources to more critical theaters (MacDonald & Parent, 2018). Rather than signaling collapse, retrenchment reflects an effort to align ends with means. In parallel, Posen (2007) argues that the United States should limit military activism abroad and focus on core strategic interests, particularly amid intensifying great power competition. Within this framework, the Middle East is increasingly treated as a secondary theater. This reorientation is reflected in withdrawal patterns such as Afghanistan, which indicate resource reallocation rather than battlefield failure (Wardoyo, 2024).

However, retrenchment carries significant implications. Reduced engagement diminishes the capacity for sustained crisis management and encourages a more selective, often reactive, use of force. The result is a paradox: while retrenchment aims to preserve long-term power, it weakens the US’s stabilizing role in regions like the Middle East. What emerges is not disengagement but uneven, episodic intervention, less predictable and more prone to generating instability. In this sense, retrenchment does not remove the United States from the region; it transforms its presence into a more volatile force.

Consequently, the US’s actions appear increasingly reactive and less anchored in a coherent long-term strategy. For regional actors, particularly Gulf states, this creates a paradox: the power that once functioned as the ultimate stabilizer is now perceived as a source of volatility. The Iranian case thus underscores the fragility and possible erosion of the US’s role as a reliable security guarantor.

 

The New Reality for Gulf Security

For decades, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have anchored their security strategies on American protection. This arrangement was not only military but deeply political, reflecting a patron–client relationship in which the US guarantees formed the cornerstone of regional order. Following the Gulf War, Washington institutionalized this role through forward deployments, defense agreements, and extensive arms transfers, embedding Gulf militaries within a the US-led security architecture (Roberts, 2025). This dependence was both material and structural, shaping doctrines, procurement patterns, and regime security strategies. As recent scholarship notes, Gulf security has long rested on this asymmetrical reliance (Bakir, 2025). Yet, as argued by Kausikan et al (2023), shifting global priorities and the US retrenchment have begun to erode the credibility of these guarantees, prompting Gulf states to reassess their dependence and explore alternatives.

What is unfolding is not simply a weakening of the US’s commitment but the gradual unravelling of a deeply embedded security architecture. As Washington recalibrates its global posture, its commitment to Middle Eastern security appears increasingly conditional. Regional allies now face an uncomfortable reality: the guarantor they have long depended on may no longer be willing, or able, to provide the same level of protection. The Iran war amplifies this uncertainty. If the US intervention can trigger escalation without delivering decisive outcomes, and if strategic focus lies elsewhere, the credibility of its guarantees inevitably comes into question. This is not merely perceptual but structural: the reliability of external security provision is now contested.

 

Iran’s Asymmetric Escalation: Cheap Offense, Costly defense

Third, and perhaps most consequentially, Iran’s response introduces a new dimension to regional security calculations. By targeting not only military assets but also economic and civilian infrastructure, Iran expands conflict beyond conventional boundaries. Evidence shows that Iranian strikes have systematically targeted critical infrastructure across the Gulf, including energy facilities, ports, and logistical nodes; prioritizing disruption over battlefield dominance (Clarke, Hammad, & Wajid, 2026). This reflects a strategy of asymmetric escalation, in which Iran uses relatively low-cost tools such as drones to impose disproportionately high costs on adversaries with far more expensive defense systems (Wardoyo, 2026; Düz, 2026).

The result is a “cheap offense versus costly defense” dynamic that structurally disadvantages Gulf states, forcing them to absorb repeated shocks despite reliance on advanced Western systems. In this context, U.S. security guarantees become increasingly hollow: rather than deterring attacks, they turn Gulf states into frontline targets, as Iran strikes the US-aligned territories to raise the costs of intervention (Clarke, Hammad, & Wajid, 2026). Far from stabilizing the region, this dynamic intensifies vulnerability and exposes the limits of external protection.

Moreover, this development is particularly alarming for Gulf states. Their economic models remain structurally dependent on hydrocarbon activity, which continues to shape growth, fiscal stability, and overall performance despite diversification efforts (IMF, 2025). At the same time, these economies are deeply embedded in global trade and logistics networks, where ports, energy flows, and re-export systems serve as critical nodes linking the region to global markets. These networks are not only central to growth but also highly exposed to disruption (Schneider, 2026). This dependence is reinforced by governance models that rely on externally connected economic systems and state-led coordination of key sectors (Al-Kuwari, 2026).

The result is an economic architecture that is both highly integrated and inherently vulnerable. Disruptions to energy infrastructure, logistics hubs, or trade flows can cascade through the entire system. In this context, the prospect that these assets could become targets raises fundamental questions about deterrence and defense. Security arrangements centered on military protection alone are increasingly inadequate to address vulnerabilities that are economic, systemic, and embedded in global interdependence.

 

Conclusion

Regional actors are therefore compelled to rethink their strategic positioning. Some may pursue hedging strategies by diversifying security partnerships beyond the US, including limited engagement with China and Russia, or by investing in indigenous defense capabilities to enhance autonomy. At the same time, renewed emphasis on regional diplomacy reflects a recognition that reliance on external guarantors alone is no longer sufficient. Stability may increasingly depend on direct engagement among local actors, including long-standing rivals.

Taken together, these shifts suggest that the Middle East is moving away from the classic model of a penetrated system toward a more complex and uncertain configuration. External powers remain influential, but their roles are less predictable and more contested. Local actors are gaining agency but also bearing greater responsibility. This transition is inherently unstable: the absence of a clear stabilizing force increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation. Yet the diversification of strategies and emergence of new diplomatic initiatives also open pathways toward a more autonomous regional order.

In this sense, the Middle East is no longer simply a penetrated system. It is becoming a laboratory of strategic uncertainty, where old patterns persist, but new logics are taking shape.

Hedging in Cyberspace: Indonesia Between U.S.–China Cyber Competition

Hedging in Cyberspace: Indonesia Between U.S.–China Cyber Competition

Mar 30, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 6 | March 2026

Authors:

Mochammad Jose Akmal – Government Science Graduate, Universitas Diponegoro

 

Summary

Indonesia’s cyber posture is best understood not as a binary alignment between Washington and Beijing, but as an ongoing effort to preserve strategic autonomy within a deeply transnational digital ecosystem—where infrastructure, vendors, data flows, and intelligence dependencies are globally intertwined. This autonomy is increasingly strained by a threat environment that is expansive, persistent, and operationally significant, extending well beyond what any single vendor report can capture. The 2026 analysis by Unit 42 is valuable insofar as it identifies a state-aligned espionage cluster, TGR-STA-1030, which compromised at least 70 organisations across 37 countries and conducted reconnaissance activities spanning 155 countries, including Indonesia. However, this report should be treated as a single empirical data point rather than as the primary evidentiary anchor. Broader evidence—drawn from publicly reported Indonesian incidents, national disclosures, and regional cybersecurity assessments—demonstrates that Indonesia has experienced repeated and measurable cyber disruptions affecting government systems and critical public services.

Keywords: Cybersecurity, Cyber diplomacy, Strategic hedging, Cyber resilience

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State-Backed Cyber Threats and Global Exposure

A more grounded reading of Indonesia’s threat environment is not that a single advanced actor is targeting the country, but rather that it operates within a broader, constantly active ecosystem of cyber espionage, criminal activity, and opportunistic attacks. In that sense, the risk is less about one persistent threat and more about continuous exposure across a wide attack surface.

Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 findings reflect this pattern. The group tracked as TGR-STA-1030 did not rely on particularly novel techniques. Instead, it combined phishing—often using government-related lures such as ministry restructuring narratives—with malicious archives hosted overseas and the exploitation of known vulnerabilities rather than zero-days. It also used widely available tools such as Cobalt Strike, VShell, and web shells, targeting services such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft OMI, and SAP Solution Manager, as well as vulnerabilities such as CVE-2019-11580 in e-passport and e-visa systems. What stands out here is not sophistication, but accessibility. These are methods and tools that are well understood and widely used. That shifts the focus away from rare, high-end exploits and toward more persistent structural issues—exposed services, weak identity management, and slow patching cycles. In practice, those gaps create just as much risk, especially when they affect systems tied to public administration and national infrastructure.

Indonesian government data support this broader picture. BSSN’s 2023 report records extremely high volumes of anomalous activity, including hundreds of millions of network anomalies, millions of APT-related and ransomware events, and hundreds of confirmed incidents. It also highlights significant exposure on the dark web affecting hundreds of stakeholders, including government entities. The public administration sector appears most affected, with recurring issues such as web defacement, ransomware, and data breaches.

Data from Kominfo-CSIRT in 2024 points in the same direction. It shows sustained anomaly traffic at scale and multiple incidents within a single ministry, where malicious file injection was the most common attack type. None of these figures clearly points to a single actor or campaign. Instead, they show something more structural: compromise is frequent, distributed, and ongoing. That makes the challenge less about attribution and more about resilience—reducing exposure, improving baseline security practices, and treating cyber risk as a constant condition rather than an occasional disruption.

A clear illustration of these risks is the 2024 ransomware attack on Indonesia’s national data centre. According to Reuters, the breach disrupted immigration and airport services, affected more than 230 public agencies across the archipelago, and involved a ransom demand of about $8 million (Rp135.5 billion). Officials further indicated that 98% of the data in one compromised facility had not been backed up. This incident is significant because it demonstrates that cyber threats have escalated to the point of affecting national security and sovereignty. The consequences extended beyond technical disruption to include service outages, administrative paralysis, reputational harm to the government, and substantial recovery costs. It underscores that cyber policy should not be treated merely as an abstract issue of information security, but as a critical component of state resilience and governance.

 

Geopolitical Context and Why Attribution Must Be Handled Carefully

Indonesia’s cyber posture is shaped by great-power rivalry, but attribution is more complex than political rhetoric suggests. Technical attribution identifies infrastructure, tools, and behaviour; legal attribution assesses whether those facts meet standards for state responsibility; political attribution is the public act of naming an actor. These are distinct. Under international law, political attribution alone does not justify countermeasures—state responsibility requires an internationally wrongful act attributable to a state. Although Articles 4–11 of the ILC’s ARSIWA reflect customary law, cyber operations’ use of proxies, obfuscation, and layered infrastructure makes evidentiary certainty difficult to establish.

This caution is especially important for Indonesia. Diplomatic responses to suspected state-backed activity should rest on evidence robust enough to withstand domestic, partner, and international scrutiny. That does not require silence, but rather calibrated responses: technical mitigation, selective disclosure, bilateral demarches, regional consultation, and, only then, explicit political attribution if the evidentiary threshold is met. Debates reflected in the Tallinn Manual highlight how contested the boundaries are between espionage, sovereignty violations, and unlawful coercion in cyberspace. Accordingly, claims of state sponsorship should not be presumed without clearly articulated and independently justified evidence.

 

What Hedging Looks Like In Practice

Hedging should be treated as a concrete portfolio strategy, not a vague commitment to “balance.” For Indonesia, this means sustaining cyber cooperation with both the United States and China while ensuring neither becomes indispensable in a way that would constrain policy autonomy. In practice, that requires diversified procurement across ecosystems, dual-track training for government and CERT personnel, conditional intelligence sharing that preserves data sovereignty, and rules that avoid vendor lock-in. Interoperability and auditability should be non-negotiable procurement criteria. These measures translate hedging from rhetoric into an actionable governance model.

Indonesia already has the foundations for this approach. Public records indicate cyber cooperation with both Washington and Beijing, including a US–Indonesia letter of intent and an Indonesia–China MoU on cybersecurity capacity and technology. While this does not imply policy equivalence, it demonstrates that Jakarta maintains multiple external cyber channels. The central policy issue, then, is not whether Indonesia hedges, but whether that logic is embedded in procurement, training, and incident-response frameworks—so that when partner expectations diverge, Indonesia preserves option value and safeguards its policy autonomy.

 

Private-Sector and Supply-chain Dynamics

Any serious cyber strategy for Indonesia must start with a simple premise: resilience is built on a diverse ecosystem—government, telcos, cloud providers, integrators, academia, and private security firms. The state can set strategy and legal baselines, but operational control—telemetry, patching, identity, and incident response—largely sits with private actors. Indonesian business guidance already reflects this shift: Kadin’s 2025 white paper prioritises critical infrastructure resilience, governance, talent, public–private partnerships, standardisation, and strengthening the domestic cybersecurity industry—reducing dependence on foreign tools and opaque vendor ecosystems.

Procurement, therefore, becomes cyber policy. CISA frames ICT supply-chain risk management as core to resilience, with tools like the KEV catalogue to prioritise actively exploited vulnerabilities, while highlighting phishing and supply-chain compromise as persistent entry points. For Indonesia, this translates into embedding vendor vetting, code provenance, patch SLAs, privileged-access controls, and audit rights into public procurement—especially for government systems, aviation, data centres, and critical infrastructure.

Indonesia’s own incidents reinforce this approach. Kominfo-CSIRT’s 2024 report shows response efforts depended on forensics, backup restoration, endpoint protection, vulnerability assessment, and coordination with BSSN, law enforcement, and the wider cybersecurity community. Resilience, therefore, is not just prevention—it requires robust recovery architecture, disciplined backups, segmentation, and a tested incident-response capability.

 

ASEAN and the Limits of Regional Multilateralism

ASEAN is a pragmatic platform for reducing bilateral exposure, but it should not be overstated. Its cyber strategy offers useful institutional scaffolding—such as the ASEAN CERT Maturity Framework, prospective regional CERT cooperation, and coordinated incident-response mechanisms. However, persistent capability asymmetries, uneven public–private information sharing, and limited transparency constrain effectiveness.

Indonesia should therefore engage ASEAN selectively, focusing on achievable outcomes: standardised incident taxonomies, baseline CERT coordination, joint exercises, and norms of responsible behaviour rather than rapid strategic convergence. Multilateralism helps dilute the influence of any single external power and expands Indonesia’s ability to shape rules collectively.

That said, effective regionalism requires more than rhetorical support for “ASEAN centrality.” It depends on harmonised incident definitions, agreed emergency coordination channels, and routine interoperability exercises that incorporate the private sector, reflecting the operational reality that cyber defence extends beyond government institutions.

 

Policy Recommendations

Indonesia should spell out what “hedging” actually means in its cyber policies. In practice, that requires clarity on what kinds of cooperation are allowed, what data can be shared, which technologies are acceptable, and where the limits lie. These boundaries should not remain abstract—they need to be enforceable through auditable contracts with vendors and by ensuring the state retains control over critical logs and metadata. At the same time, more capabilities should be built at home. Universities, CSIRTs, and local firms can take on a larger role in training, digital forensics, and secure procurement so that resilience does not depend entirely on external platforms. This direction is already consistent with patterns seen in public-sector incidents, BSSN priorities, and the private sector’s growing focus on resilience.

It is also important to distinguish between cooperation and dependence. Working with the United States on intelligence can improve early warning and incident response, while engagement with China on infrastructure may still be useful under clear and transparent rules. The key is that neither relationship should limit Indonesia’s room to act—data sovereignty, the ability to switch vendors, and the avoidance of concentration in critical systems must remain intact. In that sense, hedging is less about staying neutral and more about preserving flexibility under changing conditions.

At the regional level, capacity-building should focus on what is realistically achievable. ASEAN initiatives—such as joint exercises, shared CERT practices, and cross-border protocols—still matter, but progress is likely to come from narrower steps first. Common training programs, shared terminology, and baseline standards for public institutions and critical infrastructure operators within Indonesia are more practical in the near term. Compared to an ambitious, fully integrated regional framework, this incremental approach is more workable and better aligned with ASEAN’s institutional limits.

 

Conclusion

Indonesia’s cyber challenge extends well beyond its position between the United States and China. Its digital infrastructure faces a layered threat environment that includes espionage, ransomware, phishing, exploitation of known vulnerabilities, and supply chain-related risks. Evidence from BSSN, Kominfo-CSIRT, Reuters reporting on the national data centre attack, CISA guidance, and Unit 42’s global campaign converges on a clear conclusion: cyber resilience is now a core issue of national security and state capacity. Hedging remains a viable strategy, but only if it is operationalised through disciplined procurement, mature incident response, legal clarity around attribution, and regional cooperation that reinforces—rather than compromises—strategic autonomy.

India’s Multi-Alignment Compass: Insight from the 2026 Raisina Dialogue

India’s Multi-Alignment Compass: Insight from the 2026 Raisina Dialogue

Mar 26, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 5 | March 2026

Authors:

Chaula Rininta Anindya – Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia

 

Summary

India’s premier geopolitical forum, the Raisina Dialogue – organised by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in partnership with the Ministry of External Affairs – underscored New Delhi’s commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment amid global turbulence. This commentary draws from the author’s personal and independent observation as a 2026 Raisina Young Fellow. It examines India’s foreign policy through the lens of this year’s Dialogue. First, it analyses debates on India’s rise via the US’s offensive realism and India’s Kautilyan politics. Then, it traces India’s foreign policy evolution from non-alignment to multi-alignment, as shown by its ties with Israel and Iran. Finally, it explores India’s statecraft as embodied in this year’s theme Saṁskāra (assertion, accommodation, advancement).

Keywords: India, Raisina Dialogue, Strategic Autonomy, Multi-alignment, Iran-Israel War

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Introduction

In early March, India hosted its flagship geopolitics and geoeconomic conference, the 2026 Raisina Dialogue. This year, the Raisina Dialogue was held just a few days after the US-Israel War on Iran. Despite the thousands of cancellations due to the airspace closure and the ongoing conflict, 2,700 participants from 110 countries flew to New Delhi to attend in person, underscoring India and the conference’s significance. The 2026 Raisina Dialogue’s theme, Saṁskāra (an Indian philosophical concept) – assertion, accommodation, advancement – not only reflects the current geopolitical conditions but also India’s attempt to assert its position in the world.

The 2026 Raisina Dialogue invited Alexander Stubb, the President of Finland, as the Keynote Speaker. Stubb, who has just released his book “The Triangle of Power”, reiterated that the Global South will determine the future of the world order. Stubb added India, as a major power, will be a, if not the, major force, whether the world will tilt towards conflictual multipolarity or a cooperative multilateral world order. An intriguing argument coming from a president from the Global North.

As a politician-cum-scholar, Stubb proposed that India play a greater role in maintaining the world order through, at least, two proposals. First, he called for New Delhi to host a transformative moment akin to San Francisco in 1945, bringing world leaders together to reimagine international institutions through a spirit of genuine cooperation. Second, he advocated for expanding the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) permanent membership to include more representatives from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, with a permanent seat secured for India. The audience responded with applause to the proposal on the prospect of India’s permanent UNSC seat. Stubb’s message was clear; India, as a major power, bears significant responsibility for bridging divides between nations across different hemispheres.

India understands its pivotal position in navigating the uncertain and changing world order. The 2026 Raisina Dialogue demonstrates India’s determination to determine its own growth and maintain strategic autonomy in its foreign policy approach.

 

US Offensive Realism vs India’s Kautilyan Politics

On the first day of the 2026 Raisina Dialogue, the US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau, as the US head of delegation, warned India that the US will not replicate its mistake as it made with China two decades ago:

“But again, India should understand that we are not going to make the same mistakes with India that we made with China 20 years ago in terms of saying, we are going to let you develop all these markets, and then, the next thing we know, you are beating us in a lot of commercial things”

This message demonstrated the essence of U.S. offensive realism’s grand strategy. While Landau did not dismiss potential U.S.-India cooperation, he framed it within an “America First” paradigm, whereby any partnership would prioritise American interests. In this vein, the message can be reinterpreted as signalling the US’s intention to check India’s ascent through selective cooperation, ensuring it does not threaten American hegemony.

On the last day of the Raisina Dialogue, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar asserted that India’s rise is unstoppable and will be determined by India. This remark can be seen as Jaishankar’s response to Landau’s statement. Jaishankar’s statement was firm and demonstrated India’s resolve to steer its economic growth and foreign policy independently, rejecting external dictates amid global pressures. This statement also reflects India’s Kautilyan politics, an ancient Indian strategic thinker, in navigating the domestic and international politics. Kautilyan politics underscores the importance of political and economic power as a source of state security. Therefore, India’s growth will not be directed by others, but by itself, based on the benefits for its own people. Such approaches are believed to create internal stability, a prerequisite for strength and power. Consequently, India also directs its own path in alliance, leveraging a flexible and pragmatic diplomacy in a multipolar world, driven by the national interest.

 

 

India’s Strategic Autonomy and Multi-alignment: Israel and Iran’s presence

As one of the pioneers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India has clearly shifted to a multi-alignment foreign policy. Minister Jaishankar has also mentioned the country’s preference for a multi-alignment approach in his book, “The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World.” Minister Jaishankar (2020) wrote:

“Taking off on non-alignment, it is sometimes useful to speak of multi-alignment. It appears more energetic and participative as compared to an earlier posture of abstention or non-involvement.”

Jaishankar further reiterated that the approach aims for “strategic convergence instead of tactical convenience.” The multi-alignment approach could also be seen in the 2026 Raisina Dialogue. After the war broke out in the Middle East, all attention was on the tensions between Israel and Iran. Raisina Dialogue proved to be more than a conference when it managed to invite the Foreign Minister of Israel, virtually, Gideon Saar and Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh. On the first day of the dialogue, Saar highlighted that the goal of this war was to remove the existential threat in the long run, whereas on the second day, Khatibzadeh stressed that it was an existential war. Both countries claimed that they are fighting a war to ensure their survival. India provided an avenue for the two countries to affirm their stance on the global stage.

One might argue that India is leaning toward Israel following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel before the war occurred. The visit also gained criticism from a leading member of the major opposition party, defining the visit as “shameful” and “ill-timed”. India’s relations with Israel have indeed significantly improved under Prime Minister Modi, who became the first Indian Prime Minister to make an official visit to Israel back in 2017. During his recent trip to Israel, Modi underscored the solidarity towards Israel under the pretext of “ancient civilisation ties.” India could not deny its relations with Israel, as Israel has become a critical partner in defence technology development. 

The presence of Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, however, signifies the nuance embedded in India’s foreign policy approach: strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. Iran’s acceptance of the invitation hinged on India demonstrating its commitment to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment; a delicate equilibrium that allows New Delhi to deepen ties with Israel while refraining from outright hostility toward Tehran. This balancing act was most visible when India authorised the docking of Iranian warships at its ports following the US-Israel attack on Iran, claiming that it was “the right thing to do” and a form of “humanitarian gesture.”

Once again, India demonstrated its multi-alignment approach amid escalating regional tensions. While other nations scrambled to secure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, two Indian naval vessels safely passed the strait, thanks to close dialogue with Iranian counterparts. This case highlights Iran’s confidence in India.

 

Conclusion

The 2026 Raisina Dialogue showed India’s deliberate pivot toward strategic autonomy and multi-alignment in an increasingly fractured world order. The presence of world leaders and their candid dialogues underscored the platform’s leverage as a genuine forum for diverse geopolitical perspectives. The fundamental essence of India’s Saṁskāra – this year’s theme – is well represented in the dialogue. Through this dialogue, India strongly asserted its identity as an independent nation with a strategic autonomy whose path could not be dictated by others. The dialogue also accommodated different views through frank conversations among world leaders, showcasing India’s balanced engagement with global powers. Lastly, the dialogue embraces all nations to advance together with India through constructive dialogues amid rapid global shifts. Saṁskāra is thus not merely a philosophical theme but a blueprint for India’s statecraft in a multipolar world.

 

 

Acknowledgement

This article is the author’s personal reflection from attending the 2026 Raisina Dialogue as a Raisina Young Fellow. These views represent independent analysis and do not imply endorsement by any organisation or government.

A Troubling Departure: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Colonial Question

A Troubling Departure: Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the Colonial Question

Mar 25, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 4 | March 2026

Authors:

Ardhitya Eduard Yeremia Lalisang – Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia; member of “South Solidarity, Development, and Transformation for Global Justice” Research Cluster

 

Summary

Indonesia’s recent foreign policy conduct under President Prabowo reveals three alarming tendencies. Jakarta orbits the major powers. It puts aside the Palestinian voice by joining the Trump-led Board of Peace. It treats its domestic audience as something to be managed, rather than heard. Together, these reproduce coloniality both externally and internally. This is a troubling departure from Indonesia’s own founding principle: anti-colonialism. Three alternatives are proposed: de-centering major powers to reclaim space for ASEAN and South-South partnership, articulating a durable strategy for contributing to Palestinian freedom, and treating the people as stakeholders rather than spectators. Imagining these alternatives is an act of refusal to be dominated by the government’s overwhelming discourse about what the country’s foreign policy can and cannot be.

Keywords: Indonesia’s foreign policy, anti-colonialism, decolonial approach, coloniality.



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Not many countries enshrine their anti-colonial stance in their constitution. Indonesia is an exception for putting that in its very first sentence. It says that independence is the right of all nations and that colonialism must be abolished. As the host of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference, anti-colonial solidarity further became central to Indonesia’s foreign policy profile. What has been happening lately in how Jakarta conducts its foreign policy is a troubling departure.

Under President Prabowo, Indonesia’s foreign policy has been primarily oriented toward the major powers. Bilateral exchanges with China, Russia, France, Australia, and now the United States crowd the diplomatic calendar. President Prabowo appears keen to position Indonesia among the strong, as if recognition from the centre of global power is what makes this country matter.

Indonesia has joined the Trump-led Board of Peace. It accepted the invitation to sit at a table where external powers decide the future of Palestine without a single Palestinian present. It participated in someone else’s project without a clear strategy of its own. There is no roadmap for what Jakarta would do within the Board to walk with Palestinians toward their freedom. The approach seems to be: join first, figure out the rest later.

This, among other things, is why the decision to join the Board has drawn public criticism. Defending the decision, the government says foreign policy requires discretion and that not everything can be disclosed. President Prabowo further responded by explaining his decision to former foreign ministers, academics, experts, and Muslim leaders. The people, meanwhile, were left as spectators rather than stakeholders. They watched how most of those intermediary elites eventually spoke in favour of the government’s position after the meeting.

Taken together, these amount to a foreign policy that reproduces colonial structures both externally and internally. Jakarta put aside the Palestinian voice by surrendering its own voice to Washington, while seeking to silence dissenting internal voices by approaching the intermediary elites.

What would an alternative look like? I offer three proposals.

First, de-center the major powers. Relations with great powers matter and will continue to matter. However, Jakarta should not let them define the horizon of Indonesia’s foreign policy. There is ample room for deepening the ASEAN community, engagement with fellow developing nations and expanding South-South partnerships. Indonesia’s external affairs are too vast and its potential too great to be reduced to managing relationships with major powers. To that end, Indonesia has to reclaim the space that the gravitational pull of major powers has crowded out.

Second, articulate a clear strategy for how Indonesia contributes to Palestinian freedom. Indonesia’s consistent voting at the United Nations, humanitarian assistance, and refusal to recognise Israel are not nothing. However, after decades of invoking the Palestinian cause, Jakarta must have more than rhetoric. Jakarta should have a durable roadmap that is not hostage to the impulses of whoever sits in the presidential palace, and that reflects the constitutional commitment enshrined in the founding principles of the republic.

Third, treat the people as stakeholders. Jakarta should explain the reasoning behind foreign policy decisions directly to the people. In this regard, press conferences alone are insufficient without an acknowledgement that the people have a legitimate claim on how their country positions itself in the world. Channels should be open for civil society to also shape Indonesia’s foreign policy conduct.

These are proposals for attitudinal change. It is worth noting that attitudinal change alone will not dismantle the unequal power structure in which Indonesia is positioned globally, and in which the governing elites are positioned vis-à-vis the people internally. But this is where the work begins.

More work is needed to imagine an alternative outlook when the present insists there is none. It is an act of refusal to be dominated by the government’s overwhelming discourse about what the country’s foreign policy can and cannot be.

Remember, the first sentence of the constitution was an act of imagination. It was written when Indonesia was still fighting for its own survival. If the founders of Indonesia could imagine the abolition of colonialism from a position of weakness, Indonesia can certainly demand it from a position of independence.

Indonesia was once a champion of anti-colonial struggle. Today, the country is sleepwalking into reproducing coloniality at home and abroad. The least we can do is wake up and ask why.

 

Acknowledgement

This piece is the author’s reflection following participation in the 2026 Association of Asian Studies (AAS) Conference. The author is grateful to all those whose stimulating conversations and talks throughout the conference informed this writing. The views expressed here, however, remain solely the author’s own.

Latin America or Africa? Explaining Indonesia’s Selective Trade Deepening

Latin America or Africa? Explaining Indonesia’s Selective Trade Deepening

Feb 24, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 3 | February 2026

Authors:

Rachmasari Nur Al-Husin –Doctoral Student and Junior Fellow at Global South Solidarity, Department of International Relations, Universitas Indonesia

 

Summary

Indonesia has prioritised trade diversification toward non-traditional partners within the framework of South–South cooperation. However, its trade diplomacy toward Latin America and Africa has developed unevenly. While comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs) have been concluded with Latin American partners, engagement with Africa remains largely confined to preferential trade agreements (PTAs), despite Africa’s stronger commodity complementarity and economic stability. This article argues that the divergence is driven less by economic fundamentals than by institutional comfort, political signalling, and policy learning effects. Latin America has served as a lower-risk environment for comprehensive trade engagement, while Africa remains primarily framed through development cooperation, limiting deeper trade integration. The article highlights the need to recalibrate Indonesia’s trade diplomacy toward Africa to achieve more coherent South-South engagement.

Keywords: Trade diplomacy, South-South cooperation, Non-traditional markets



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Introduction

Indonesia’s foreign economic policy has increasingly emphasised diversifying trade partners beyond traditional markets in East Asia, Europe, and North America. Within this agenda, Latin America and Africa are often grouped as non-traditional partners under the broader banner of South–South cooperation. Both regions are frequently described as “untapped markets,” each accounting for less than five per cent of Indonesia’s total exports (Sabaruddin, 2016). However, Indonesia’s trade diplomacy toward these two regions has evolved along sharply different trajectories.

While Indonesia has concluded and expanded comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs) with Latin American partners, most notably Chile, Peru, and MERCOSUR, its engagement with Africa remains largely confined to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, 2025). This divergence is puzzling. Africa offers stronger commodity complementarity with Indonesia, a growing consumer base, and comparatively stable post-pandemic economic growth. Latin America, by contrast, shares structural similarities with Indonesia’s export profile, often resulting in competitive rather than complementary trade relations.

This commentary argues that economic fundamentals do not primarily drive Indonesia’s deeper trade engagement with Latin America. Instead, it reflects a combination of institutional comfort, political signalling, and policy-learning effects that shape how Indonesia translates opportunities into binding trade commitments.

 

Economic Potential vs Policy Reality

From an economic standpoint, Africa appears to be the more promising partner for Indonesia’s trade expansion. Indonesia’s export structure, dominated by vegetable oils, paper products, light manufacturing, automotive components, and basic consumer goods, aligns closely with African import demand (UN Comtrade, 2025). Trade relations with Africa have also demonstrated relative resilience during periods of global economic disruption. During the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021), while Indonesia’s exports to several Latin American markets contracted sharply due to supply-chain disruptions and commodity price volatility, exports to key African partners such as South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria rebounded more quickly in 2021, supported by sustained demand for palm oil, pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods (UN Comtrade, 2025). Similarly, during the post-pandemic commodity price correction in 2022–2023, Indonesia maintained trade surpluses with several African partners, indicating relatively stable demand structures compared to more volatile Latin American markets.

Latin America presents a different economic profile. Many Latin American economies, like Indonesia, remain heavily reliant on primary commodities and resource-based exports. This structural similarity limits broad-based complementarity and confines trade to specific niches such as footwear, electronics, and selected manufactured goods (Ramana & Retnosari, 2018). As a result, Indonesia’s export portfolio in Latin America does not fully reflect its overall comparative advantages.

Macroeconomic indicators further underscore this contrast. Although Latin America’s aggregate nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) remains larger, African economies have displayed more stable real GDP growth and, in recent years, higher purchasing power parity (PPP) levels (International Monetary Fund, 2025). These trends suggest that Africa offers not only market potential but also greater resilience to external shocks.

Despite these indicators, economic potential has not translated into policy depth. Indonesia’s trade agreements with Africa remain limited in scope, while Latin America has become the focal point for comprehensive frameworks. This disconnect points to factors beyond economic rationality shaping Indonesia’s trade diplomacy.

 

Institutional Comfort and Policy Learning in Latin America

Indonesia’s deeper engagement with Latin America is best understood through the lens of institutional familiarity and policy learning. The Indonesia-Chile Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IC-CEPA), formally signed in December 2017 and entering into force in August 2019, initially focused on trade in goods and was later expanded to include services and investment chapters. Since its implementation, IC-CEPA has functioned as a practical learning platform for Indonesian trade negotiators. The agreement offered a relatively manageable environment in which Indonesia could experiment with regulatory provisions, services liberalisation, and dispute settlement mechanisms (Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, 2024).

Latin American partners also tend to possess regulatory structures and negotiation capacities that align more closely with Indonesia’s institutional preferences. This compatibility reduces transaction costs and implementation uncertainty, making comprehensive agreements appear less risky (Taufiqqurrachman & Handoyo, 2021). Over time, these experiences have generated a path-dependent logic. Once a CEPA framework proved workable in Latin America, extending similar arrangements to other countries in the region became both feasible and strategically attractive. For example, negotiation experiences from the IC-CEPA CEPA informed Indonesia’s subsequent engagement with Peru through the Indonesia-Peru CEPA (IP-CEPA), signed in 2018 and entering into force in 2021, as well as exploratory discussions with MERCOSUR. Regulatory templates, tariff-elimination schedules, and negotiation modalities developed in Chile were partially replicated in subsequent talks, illustrating how institutional learning generated incremental expansion within the same regional cluster.

Political signalling has further reinforced this trajectory. Deep trade agreements with Latin American partners allow Indonesia to project an image of openness, reform orientation, and commitment to high-standard trade governance. Such signalling strengthens Indonesia’s credibility not only in bilateral relations but also within wider global trade networks (Al-Husin & Virgianita, 2024). Latin America, in this sense, has become a relatively “safe arena” for Indonesia’s comprehensive trade diplomacy.

 

Africa: Strong Potential, Limited Policy Translation

Indonesia’s engagement with Africa has followed a markedly different path. Rather than being anchored in trade liberalisation, relations have historically emphasised political solidarity, development cooperation, and technical assistance (Suryanta & Patunru, 2023). Capacity-building programmes, infrastructure initiatives, and development forums dominate the bilateral agenda, reinforcing Africa’s position as a partner for cooperation rather than market integration.

While these initiatives strengthen diplomatic ties, they do not automatically translate into binding trade commitments. PTA concluded that African partners remain narrow in scope and lack the regulatory depth associated with CEPAs. Unlike comprehensive agreements, they do not substantially reshape market access, investment frameworks, or services trade.

Institutional fragmentation further complicates deeper engagement. Diverse regulatory regimes, uneven negotiation capacities, and implementation challenges increase the perceived risks of comprehensive agreements. Although the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a pathway toward market integration, Indonesia has yet to articulate a clear strategy for leveraging AfCFTA as a platform for deeper trade engagement (Asche, 2021).

Political symbolism also plays an ambivalent role. Africa occupies a central place in Indonesia’s diplomatic identity through the legacy of the Bandung Conference and South-South solidarity. However, this historical narrative often reinforces a development-oriented framing, inadvertently sidelining trade liberalisation as a policy priority (Heryadi, Darmastuti, & Rachman, 2024). As a result, Africa’s economic potential remains under-translated into Indonesia’s trade architecture.

 

Strategic Implications for Indonesia

Indonesia’s two-track approach to trade diplomacy carries important strategic implications (Tobing & Virgianita, 2020). Prioritising institutional comfort over economic opportunity risks underutilising Africa’s growing market potential, particularly as other emerging economies pursue deeper trade and investment frameworks on the continent. The continued separation between development cooperation and trade policy also limits coherence, reducing the effectiveness of Indonesia’s economic diplomacy.

To address this gap, Indonesia’s trade strategy would benefit from reframing Africa not merely as a development partner but as a trade-led opportunity. This requires integrating trade objectives into existing diplomatic platforms and aligning technical cooperation with longer-term market access goals. AfCFTA, in particular, offers a strategic entry point for phased and modular engagement that could gradually move beyond PTA-level commitments.

Equally important is strengthening institutional preparedness. Enhancing regulatory cooperation, negotiation capacity, and policy coordination would reduce perceived risks and enable Indonesia to pursue deeper agreements with greater confidence. Aligning the normative language of South-South solidarity with concrete trade objectives would also help ensure that political symbolism supports, rather than substitutes for, economic integration.

At the institutional level, coordination would need to be led primarily by the Ministry of Trade (Kemendag), particularly the Directorate General of International Trade Negotiations (Ditjen PPI), in close collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu), the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, and sectoral ministries such as Industry and Investment. Indonesian embassies in key African capitals would also play a crucial role in market intelligence and regulatory mapping. Stronger inter-ministerial coordination would reduce fragmentation and align development cooperation instruments with trade negotiation objectives.

 

Conclusion

Indonesia’s deeper trade diplomacy with Latin America reflects institutional familiarity, political signalling, and accumulated policy learning rather than superior economic fundamentals. Africa, despite offering stronger economic complementarity and greater stability, remains constrained by a development-oriented framing and institutional caution. Addressing this misalignment requires coordinated action among key stakeholders. The Ministry of Trade must lead negotiation recalibration, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reframing Africa within Indonesia’s economic diplomacy narrative. The Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs should ensure cross-sectoral alignment, while Indonesian embassies and trade promotion centers must strengthen market intelligence. Engagement with private-sector actors, particularly exporters and industry associations, is equally critical to translate diplomatic intent into commercial outcomes. Without such stakeholder alignment, Indonesia’s South–South engagement risks remaining symbolic rather than structurally transformative.

 

References

Sabaruddin, S. S. (2016). Penguatan Diplomasi Ekonomi Indonesia Mendesain Clustering Tujuan Pasar Ekspor Indonesia: Pasar Tradisional vs Pasar Non-Tradisional. Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional, 12(2).

Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. (2025). Retrieved 11 November 2025, from https://ditjenppi.kemendag.go.id/

UN Comtrade. (2025). Retrieved 12 November 2025, from https://comtradeplus.un.org/

Ramana, F., & Retnosari, L. (2018). Analysis of Priority Countries and Products for Indonesian Export Diversification in Latin America. International Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business, 9(8).

Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. (2024, September 1). Indonesia Trade Negotiations Agenda as of 1 Sep 2024. Retrieved 1 Februari 2025, from https://ditjenppi.kemendag.go.id/publikasi/indonesia-trade-negotiations-agenda-concludedimplemented-as-of-1-sep-2024

Taufiqqurrachman, F., & Handoyo, R. (2021). Analisis Dampak IC-CEPA Terhadap Perekonomian Indonesia. Buletin Ilmiah Litbang Perdagangan, 15(1).

Al-Husin, R., & Virgianita, A. (2024). Mapping the Literature on the Relationship Between Indonesia and Chile as Non-Traditional Partners. Journal La Sociale, 5(2).

Suryanta, B., & Patunru, A. (2023). Trade Impediments in Indonesia. Journal of Economic Integration, 38(2).

Asche, H. (2021). The Reality of African Trade Integration: Challenges of Implementation. In H. Asche, Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development. Springer.

Heryadi, R., Darmastuti, S., & Rachman, A. (2024). Advancing South-South Cooperation in Education: Indonesian Experience With South Africa. F1000 Research Ltd, 11(982).

Tobing, F., & Virgianita, A. (2020). Functional Multi-Track and Multilevel Economic Diplomacy to Strengthen Trade Relations Between Indonesia, Chile, and Peru Conditions For Success. Regions and Cohesion, 10(1).

Beyond Administrative Error: Dual Contracts as a Structural Failure in Indonesia-Turkey Labor Migration

Beyond Administrative Error: Dual Contracts as a Structural Failure in Indonesia-Turkey Labor Migration

Feb 24, 2026 | Commentaries

Vol. VII / No. 2 | February 2026

Authors:

Putri Ayu Ningrum – Undergraduate Student in International Relations, Universitas Amikom Yogyakarta

 

Summary

This article examines the practice of dual employment contracts affecting Indonesia Migrant Worker (PMI) in Turkey, particularly in the hospitality and services sectors. It highlight a recurring pattern in which workers sign verifield employment contracts in Indonesia (Contract A), only to be required to sign revised contracts with less favorable terms upon arrival in the destination country (Contract B). The article argues that these practices should be understood as manifestations of structural weakness in labor migration governance involving placement agencies, employers, and insufficient bilateral regulatory frameworks.

Keywords: Indonesia Migrant Workers, Dual Employment Contracts, Migrant Worker Protection, Power Assymetry, Indonesia-Turkey

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Introduction

Turkey has increasingly emerged as a destination for Indonesian Migrant Workers (PMI), particularly in the hospitality and services sectors. Rising demand for foreign labor and relatively stable income prospects compared to several traditional destination countries have increased Turkey’s appeal among Indonesian job seekers. Official Turkish labour statistics indicate that approximately 8,930 Indonesian workers received new work permits in 2024, indicating that PMI presence in Turkey forms part of a growing formal labour migration corridor (Antara News, 2025).

Historically, Indonesian labor migration has concentrated on Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (KP2MI, 2022). Recent changes in international labor market structures have contributed to the emergence of non-traditional destination countries, including Turkey (Cooper, 2014).

Behind this narrative lies the practice of dual employment contracts, referring to situations in which PMI sign employment contracts in Indonesian that are verified and recorded in SISKOP2MI ( Computerized System For Servicing and Protecting Indonesian Migrant Workers), but are subsequently presented with different contracts upon arrival. These revised contracts frequently alter wages, working hours, job descriptions, and labour rights, disadvantaging workers (Cooper, 2014).

The author’s internship experience at BP3MI Yogyakarta (Indonesian Migrant Worker Protection  Center) from September to November 2025 indicates that complaints related to dual contracts are not incidental. Several PMI recruited through official placement agencies reported discrepancies between contracts uploaded to SISKOP2MI and those enforced by employers in Turkey. This aligns with national data showing that BP2MI (Indonesian Migrant Workers Protection Agency) received 2,849 formal complaints from PMI throughout 2025 (Muhammad, 2025). BP2MI reports further identify contract violations as among the most frequently reported complaints (KP2MI, 2023).

International labour organization (ILO) literature identifies unilateral contract changes after arrival as a manifestation of power asymmetry faced by migrants workers, particularly in the absence of effective cross-border monitoring mechanism (ILO, 1996). Employment contracts are intended to function as legal protection instruments ensuring transparency, legal certainly, and informed consent form the pre- departure stage (ILO, 2010). When officially verified contracts can be altered after arrival, the protection promised by formal placement systems becomes largely illusory.

Accordingly, dual employment contracts affecting PMI in Turkey should be understood not merely as administrative violations, but as indicators of structural weaknesses in migrant worker placement governance, including inadequate oversights of placement agencies, limited agreements between Indonesian and Turkey (IOM, 2022).

 

Contract Mechanisms and the PMI Placement System

Within Indonesia’s legal PMI placement system, employment contracts constitute a fundamental document defining the rights and obligations of migrant workers. Initial contracts are prepared by destination-country placement companies affiliated with P3MI (Indonesian Migrant Worker Placement Company), then verified and uploaded to SISKOP2MI (Computerized System For Servicing and Protecting Indonesian Migrant Workers), a system managed by BP2MI to ensure contractual compliance prior to departure.

Contacts recorded in SISKOP2MI are expected to reflect actual working conditions in the destination country and serve as the basis for PMI protection during overseas employment. Contractual changes after PMI arrive constitute serious violations, as they potentially contravene protection principles stipulated in Law. No.18 of 2017 on the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia, 2017).

 

Dual Contract Practices: From Contract A to Contract B

A commonly reported pattern involves PMI being recruited through official placement agencies, signing contracts recorded in SISKOP2MI (Contract A), and completing all pre-placement procedures in accordance with BP2MI regulations. Upon arrival in Turkey, some employers require PMI to sign revised contracts (Contract B), typically justified by references to local visa classifications, work permit arrangements, or firm-level compliance practices under Turkish labor regulations.

PMI who refuse these revisions perceive their rights as violated, as the contract approved prior to departure is understood to constitute the binding employment agreement. When PMI submit complaints from Turkey of return to Indonesian, BP2MI facilitates mediation between PMI and placements agencies. While agencies often argue that Contract B falls under the authority of partner companies in Turkey, placements agencies remain responsible for ensuring consistency between job orders, employment contracts, and placement agreements throughout the migration process (Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia, 2017).

 

Analytical Question: Who Bears Responsibility?

Responsibility for dual contract practices can be examined through three perspectives.

First, placement agencies are legally obligated to ensure that job orders correspond to actual working conditions in destination countries. Systematic occurrences of dual contracts indicate shortcomings in verification and oversight. Observations during the author’s internship show that agencies involved are predominantly private placements agencies operating under government authorization. During mediation, agencies frequently adopt defensive positions, attributing contractual changes to Turkish partner companies, reflecting limited leverage due to their dependence on overseas partners for job orders and work permit arrangements, as well as the absence of effective legal resource and cross-border enforcement mechanisms (Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia, 2017).

Second, partner companies in destination countries, in this case Turkey, contribute to dual contract practices by enforcing new contracts based on internal standards or local regulatory interpretations without honouring original agreements. Such practices contradict international principles of migrant worker protection emphasizing fair and transparent employment contracts    (ILO, 2025). Power asymmetries exacerbate this situation, as PMI often form lower-income backgrounds with limited access to legal assistance accept revised contracts to avoid risks such as job termination, loss of visa sponsorship, or irregular migration status.

Third, bilateral regulatory framework between Indonesia and Turkey remain insufficient. The absence of comprehensive bilateral agreements establishing minimum contract standards and monitoring mechanisms increases the risk of contracts violations and weakens migrant worker rights enforcements (IOM, 2022).

 

Impacts on PMI and the Credibility of Official Placement Systems

Dual contract practices directly affect PMI welfare and are not confined to Turkey alone. Discrepancies between initial contracts and actual working conditions frequently result in wage reductions, excessive working hours, and loss of basic labor rights, creating insecure employment environments(Safitri & Wibisono, 2023).  These findings align with ILO assessments identifying contract violations as a major factor increasing migrant worker vulnerability (ILO, 2025). Beyond individual-level impacts, dual contract practices undermine the credibility of official placement mechanism. When formal procedures fail to ensure contractual consistency and rights protection, public trust erodes, encouraging prospective workers to consider non-procedural pathways that entail significantly higher risks (IOM, 2022).

These conditions highlights structural weaknesses in labour migration governance, involving migration authorities, labour institution, and regulatory bodies with overlapping mandates (IOM UN Migration, 2024). Weak supervision, uneven standards enforcement, and limited cross-border coordination undermine worker protection. Inconsistent implementation of international standards further contributes to irregular migration, as formal procedures come to be perceived as administrative burdens rather than protection instruments (ILO, 2017).

Civil society organizations such as Migrant Care play a role in migrant worker advocacy, however, their engagement is not uniform across destination countries. In the Turkey context, no direct involvement of migrant care was observed within official placement mechanisms during the author’s internship, indicating that migrant worker protection remains primarily reliant on state institutions such as BP3MI.

 

Conclusion: The Need for Structural Reform

The Indonesian-Turkey case demonstrates that dual contract practices are not country-specific, but reflect broader structural weakness in labour migration governance that may also arise in other destination countries where recruitment is mediated by private actors and post-placement oversight remains limited. In this sense, the Turkey case illustrates governance risks shared across both traditional and emerging destinations.

Addressing these challenges requires clear state leadership in labour migration governance, with migration and labour authorities such as BP2MI, in coordination with labour ministries, playing a central role in standard setting, recruitment oversights, and cross-border monitoring. At the bilateral level, labour Memoranda of Understanding must be strengthened or transformation into enforceable arrangements, supported by joint monitoring mechanisms and accountability provisions. Without binding and enforceable MoUs, dual contract practices are likely to persist, undermining worker protection and the credibility of official placements systems.

 

References

Antara News. (2025). Indonesian worker placement in Turkey to focus on labor-intensive jobs. Antara News. https://en.antaranews.com/news/388097/indonesian-worker-placement-in-turkey-to-focus-on-labor-intensive-jobs

Cooper, R. N. (2014). Reviewed Work(s): The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration by MARTIN RUHS Review. Council on Foreign Relations, 93(1), 7–9.

ILO. (1996). Migration for Employment Convention. International Labour Organization. https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312242

ILO. (2010). International labour migration: A rights-based approach. Internasional Labour Organization.

ILO. (2017). Resolution concerning fair and effective labour migration governance (Issue June).

ILO. (2025). Protecting migrant workers from Forced Labour. In Internasional Labour Organization (Issue May).

IOM. (2022). GUIDANCE ON BILATERAL LABOUR MIGRATION AGREEMENTS. In United Nations Network on Migration (Issue February).

IOM UN Migration. (2024). WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2024.

KP2MI. (2022). Data Penempatan dan Pelindungan. Kementrian Perlindungan Pekerja Migrant Indonesia.

KP2MI. (2023). Rekapitulasi Data Pengaduan Pekerja Migran Indonesia berdasarkan Ketegori Kasus. Kementrian Perlindungan Pekerja Migrant Indonesia.

Muhammad. (2025). Ada 2.849 Aduan Pekerja Migran Indonesia pada 2025, Ini Keluhannya. Databoks. https://databoks.katadata.co.id/ketenagakerjaan/statistik/69674595779f8/ada-2849-aduan-pekerja-migran-indonesia-pada-2025-ini-keluhannya

Safitri, D., & Wibisono, A. A. (2023). Keamanan manusia pekerja migran indonesia: ketidakamanan dan perlindungannya. Journal of Internasional Studies, 7(2), 741–769. https://doi.org/10.24198/intermestic.v7n2.17

Undang-Undang Pelindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia (2017).

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